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Abstract: 
 
The Communist Party of Great Britain is mostly understood as a fringe movement in British politics, 
both on the left and in wider British society. However, during the ‘Popular Front’, the Party 
positioned itself as the forerunners of a ‘Popular’ fight against fascism. It was a pivotal moment in the 
Party’s history, morphing in a matter of years from a fringe leftist group, to an unapologetic, patriotic 
appendage to the Labour Party. Anti-fascism was a black and white issue, as the Party decried those 
who had betrayed the British people and its democratic traditions, both at home and abroad. It was 
during the ‘Popular Front’ that the CPGB regarded democracy and its institutions, not as something to 
be overthrown and replaced with a socialist alternative, but to be fought for, enhanced, and brought 
back from the brink, in the fight against fascism. It viewed the nation in disrepair, as it embraced 
wider culture, in all its forms - regarding themselves as the embodiment of the working-class, and 
thus the national – as these two concepts became blurred within a highly localised, oppositional form 
of patriotism. Their patriotism was placed in direct opposition to what they deemed, the proto-fascist 
sympathies of Neville Chamberlain and the National Government, who were a cabal of morally 
degenerate politicians beholden to big money interests. It was they who had betrayed the real spirit of 
the British nation and tarnished its name, as the CPGB became a fundamentally national Party, whose 
internationalist ties were increasingly compromised. This uncompromising reformist politics saw the 
imperial colonies relatively ignored, as the CPGB’s previous anti-imperialist credentials were 
disregarded in favour of mild democratic reform, as well as later, defence of the ‘British national 
interest’. The Party found it increasingly difficult to balance any practical internationalist politics, 
alongside the defence of the ‘first workers’ state’, as the defeat of the Soviet Union was simply not an 
option. It was clear that their internationalism became predicated upon loyalty to one state – the 
Soviet Union. Eurocentrism took centre stage, as both the Comintern and the Party regarded the 
defence of British imperialist interests as not solely a strategic ploy, but as fundamental to any 
peaceful post-war, political order. It was this dilemma that the Party fully supported, as they in the 
name of internationalism, fully abandoned their anti-imperialist credentials in India and the Far-East, 
post-1941. It was in this melting pot of war, fascism, and the serious prospect of the defeat of 
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international socialism, that ‘national particularities’ became the raison d'être of the Party post-1935. 
As crucially, the indigenous national movement in Britain was drawn from the very same well as the 
Party’s international commitments, whose success depended on, the ‘Popular Front’ policy.  
Word Count: 449. 
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Introduction: 
 
The ‘Popular Front’ was more than any other line in the Communist Party’s history, dictated by 
political context. The rise of continental fascism, particularly following Hitler’s ascension to power in 
1933, created an unnerving sense that the Soviet Union was under real threat. Signalled by the entry 
of the USSR into the League of Nations in 1934, it was clear that a new line was in the midst. The 
Seventh World Congress of the Comintern in August 1935 established that the ‘Popular Front’ 
became the means to protect what was already won, rather than fight for further progress. It was in 
the words of one eminent Party historian, ‘like an army, equipped for the offensive, which suddenly 
found itself obliged to settle down for a lengthy siege’. 1 Revolution was no longer an immediate 
demand, but a potential end in the struggle for the defence of democracy. The international and 
national question became blurred, as constituent Parties were told to adopt a militant anti-fascist 
line, fighting for firstly, working-class unity, as well as later alongside all potential allies, (most 
notably in the CPGB’s case, alongside Winston Churchill in 1938).2 The involvement of the PCF (Parti 
communiste français) in the Front Populaire in France, as well as the PCE’s involvement in the Frente 
Popular in Spain demonstrated that there was a fundamental shift in international communist policy, 
as Parties were told to cater towards ‘national particularities’ to combat fascism. After all, the CPGB, 
were in the words of Callaghan and Harker, the ‘dynamic core’ of anti-fascist activity in Britain. 3 
In Britain, the ‘Popular Front’ saw a flourishing of a distinct, ‘British Road to Socialism’, as the CPGB 
became a social-democratic Party in all but name. It was a bolt to its very core, which led to ripples 
throughout both the Party’s national and international work.4 It saw the Party positioning its 
international loyalty as defence of, above all-else, the Soviet Union - relegating all others matters. Its 
                                                          
1 Hobsbawm, E.J. Fifty Years of Popular Front’s cited in Fyrth, J. (1985). Britain, Fascism and the Popular Front. 
Lawrence and Wishart: London.p.238. 
2 Ibid: p.241 
3 Callaghan, J. & Harker, B. (2016). British Communism: A Documentary History. Manchester University Press: 
Manchester.p.125. 
4 Whilst the ‘British Road to Socialism’ was the policy programme for the Party in 1951, the Popular Front laid 
the foundations for their post-war evolution.  
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own needs were subordinate to the first Workers State, as Harry Pollitt, leader of the CPGB told the 
Party in 1936 - ‘if the Soviet Union is destroyed as a result of our negligence…it puts back the 
prospect of socialism being achieved elsewhere’. 5 Anti-Imperialist politics, as a result, became 
compromised, haphazardly shifting between enthusiastic support, vague calls for independence, and 
outright dismissal. As many historians have noted, ‘questions of war and fascism’ began to take 
precedence over debates of imperialism.6 However, as this dissertation will argue, the Party’s 
distinction between the two was not solely the result of Party policy, but a natural result of their 
own ideological shift. Anti-imperialism became disconnected from the fight against anti-fascism, 
entirely because they were regarded as two alternate issues, resulting from differing historical 
forces. The Party’s national policy of ‘oppositional patriotism’, meant allying with reformist avenues, 
which decoupled fascism and imperialism from their socio-political forces – as in essence, these 
were not the results of ‘late-stage’ capitalism, but moral degenerations. Fascism was not a crisis of 
capitalism, nor was imperialism its ‘highest stage’, instead these came to be regarded as political 
choices, taken by corrupted, morally ‘degenerate’ politicians. It was this ideological shift that 
allowed the Party to firmly place defence of the Soviet Union, alongside a lukewarm policy to the 
colonies.  
The prime objective of this research is to examine the relationship between the CPGB’s increasingly 
nationalist shift, where the Party’s priorities increasingly became national, alongside the Party’s view 
of imperialism, seeking to analyse their specific attitudes towards India in the light of the changing 
framework of the Popular Front, fascism and imminent war. The research will examine the Party’s 
rhetoric throughout the ‘Popular Front’ period and gauge whether the CPGB were merely adapting 
to international circumstance, or were a Party undergoing fundamental reform. 
                                                          
5 PB Minutes, April 1936. 
6 Kirk, N. (2011). Labour and the Politics of Empire. Manchester University Press: Manchester.p.139. 
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The methodology to be adopted will utilise the Party’s own records at the extensive CP archive in 
Manchester, alongside numerous books, pamphlets and articles found at the Warwick Online 
Archives and in the Party’s mouthpiece, the Daily Worker. In addition, as a point of contrast, there 
has been a conscious usage of non-Communist sources, such as The Manchester Guardian and The 
Times newspaper to gauge how the Party’s work was regarded in wider society. Two questions arose 
during my research, that being, firstly, how did the Party seek to present the British nation – what 
were its methods and motivations to present progressive values as those of solely the working class?  
And to what extent were they successful in creating a new ‘national image’? To internationalise this 
shift, the second chapter deals with the Party’s anti-imperialist activism. Was anti-imperialism still a 
firm fixture in the Party’s work? Or did it increasingly become compromised because of the Popular 
Front’s emphasis on national issues; its prioritising of anti-fascism, and its nods towards reformism, 
rather than revolution? 
Throughout much of the 1920s and early 1930s, many western European parties were berated by 
the Comintern for a lack of interest in the colonies – particularly during the ‘Third Period’ – however, 
the creation of the ‘Popular Front’ placed anti-imperialist activism firmly within the hands of Parties, 
who had only a few years previously, been derided as ‘white-chauvinist’.7 In fact, this extension of 
responsibility meant the issue, as Kevin Morgan summarised, became ‘a take it or leave it’ policy. 8 
Instead, individual party members, such as Ben Bradley, Rajani Palme Dutt and Shapuri Saklatvala 
were left largely as the sole proponents of any remaining anti-imperialist thinking; for whilst 
numerous nods were made to colonial independence, many of these calls became ritualistic, 
repeating the same vague demands, that were largely ignored by much of the wider Party. The ‘time 
was not right’, was broadly the line expounded by the CP, as whilst it is unfair to state the Comintern 
                                                          
7 Callaghan, K. (1993). Rajani Palme Dutt: A Study in British Stalinism. Lawrence and Wishart: London.pp.59-60. 
8 Morgan, K. (1989). Against Fascism and War. Manchester University Press: Manchester.p.188 
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ignored the issue, they did prioritise anti-fascism, and certain anti-imperialist struggles - which only 
became more pronounced when the issue was left to national parties.  
The Party undoubtedly failed in its ambitions of building a sustained Communist movement and 
were largely a footnote in an electoral sense. However, their cultural impact cannot be understated. 
There is no doubt, historical work on the Party has exceeded the impact the Party had electorally, as 
much alike to Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists (BUF), the attention the two parties have 
received from historians, has in some way been dictated by a child-like fascination of ‘extreme 
parties’ in a seemingly plain, political system. Writing about British Communist history is beneficial 
to historians, as Kevin Morgan summarised in the mid-1990s, because ‘Its political and cultural 
influence was out of proportion to its size’, particularly during the ‘Popular Front’ period. 9 The CPGB 
is a fascinating access point to historians, for it was, to varying degrees in different periods, a 
‘revolutionary party in a non-revolutionary situation’, an implant from a foreign Russian system, and 
an organic apogee of Marxist thinking. 10 The Party’s inter-war history is normally separated into 
three periods: the first being its creation, as part of the Comintern’s plea to promote further 
revolutionary change worldwide. The second being the ‘Class against Class’ period – where the Party 
viewed capitalism’s collapse as inevitable, viewing social-democratic parties as ‘class traitors’ and 
‘social fascists’; whilst the third, the ‘Popular Front’ era, will be the focus of this study. Described as 
the ‘most fruitful period’ of the CPGB by Jim Fyrth, research on the area has been extensive, 
primarily because of the Party’s drastic ideological shift, as well as its somewhat divisive ‘about-turn’ 
during the Second World War.11  
Historians have been unanimous in concluding that the ‘Popular Front’ was a decisive break with 
what came before, with the most significant historical equivalent being the ‘social patriot’ line taken 
                                                          
9 Morgan, K. (1993). The CPGB and the Comintern Archives. Socialist History. Autumn 1993. p.19. 
10 Pelling, H. (1958). The British Communist Party: An Historical Profile. A & C. Black: London.p.67. & Laybourn, 
K. & Murphy, D. (1999). Under the Red Flag. A History of Communism in Britain. Sutton Publishing: Stroud. & 
Branson, N. (1985). History of the Communist Party of Great Britain: 1927-1941. Lawrence and Wishart: 
London. 
11 Fyrth, J. (1985). Britain, Fascism and the Popular Front. Lawrence and Wishart: London.p.15. 
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by many social democracies during the First World War. It was, according to Samuel, less traumatic 
than 1928-29, and certainly less remembered than October 1939, however, ideologically it was 
undoubtedly the ‘most momentous’. 12 Keith Laybourn has followed suit, noting that the ‘Popular 
Front’ laid the foundation, not just for fighting fascism, but consequently ‘Soviet diplomacy until the 
collapse of the Soviet Union’. 13 James Eaden and David Renton have both argued much of the same, 
stating that the ‘Popular Front’ set a precedent for the nationalist turn in the late 1940s.14  
That said, the discussion of the CPGB’s turn towards ‘nationalist’ or at best ‘patriotic sentiments’, 
beginning in the 1930s, has been much less examined, ignoring one small piece by Paul Flewers in 
1995.15 And whilst, many historians have noted that the Party did embrace patriotic language during 
the ‘Popular Front’, there is still a lack of literature detailing how, and in what ways, it achieved so. 16 
In this sense, this research hopes to offer some further light on the Party’s patriotic language and its 
vision of ‘Socialist Britain’ within the ‘Popular Front’ period. There has been a conscious usage, 
particularly in the first chapter, to cover the CPGB’s wider cultural input - whether that be songs, 
pageants or dramas - as culture became the Party’s most obvious ‘Popular Front’ expression. In this 
sense, it follows much of the ‘history from below’ perspective, which has become popular in recent 
years, emphasising ordinary members’ lives and their involvement in daily party activity, creating an 
image of a much more all-encompassing organisation, than previously thought.17  
Party members are no longer Stalinist apparatchiks, at the whims of every Moscow demand, but real 
people, deeply invested in political struggle. As such, whilst these works do not necessarily deal with 
                                                          
12 Samuel, R. (2017). The Lost World of British Communism. Verso: London. 
13 Laybourn, K. & Murphy, D. (1999). Under the Red Flag.pp.83-85. 
14 Eaden, J. & Renton, D. (2002). The Communist Party of Great Britain since 1920. Palgrave: New York.p.106. 
15 Flewers, P. (1995). From the Red Flag to the Union Jack: The Rise of Domestic Patriotism in the Communist 
Party of Great Britain. New Interventions. 6: 2. 
16 Francis Beckett’s argument that the “Communists were able to wave the Union Jack with the best of them” 
is such an example. 
Beckett, F. (1995). Enemy Within: The Rise and Fall of the British Communist Party. John Murray Ltd: 
London.p.88. 
17 Linehan, T. (2007). Communism in Britain: 1920-1939. Manchester University Press: Manchester & Morgan, 
K. et al. (2007). Communists and British Society: People of a Special Mould, 1920-1991. Rivers Oram Press: 
London. 
10 
 
the patriotic shift in Party dogma, they do help paint a more colourful picture of the Party’s attempts 
in attempting to be a ‘mass party’, furthering the Little Moscow’s Stuart Macintyre described in the 
1980s. 18 Ben Harker’s work has been a fascinating insight into the Party’s cultural output during the 
‘Popular Front’, whilst older research by Andy Croft has illuminated the cultural influence the Left 
Book Club had on 1930s British society. 19 As will be reiterated throughout, the CPGB’s shift towards 
a patriotic, populist politics is not without precedent, as Paul Ward’s work has demonstrated. Ward’s 
study of the British Left’s ‘socialist patriotism’ between 1881-1924 is an insightful look at how the 
pre-war Left fashioned itself as the forerunners of a new kind of British identity, intimately 
intertwined within a distinctly ‘British socialism’. 20  
The early British Socialists regarded their socialism as less influenced by the theory of Karl Marx, but 
what they regarded as the innate radical nature of the British people. It was less a scientific analysis 
of class struggle, as the orthodox Marxists thought of it, but a gradual move towards a more class 
harmonious society, outside of violent struggle. As Ward has suggested, a ‘continuing current on the 
British Left justified their socialism as in line with the English/British national character, history and 
political traditions’.21 Their socialism was consequently, British in character, whereas Bolshevism, 
being a Russian form of socialism, was foreign and against the very root of ‘British traditions’. 
Therefore, the CPGB from the outset had difficulties in aligning themselves with a labour movement 
whose traditions, political ideology and moral outlook, differed so widely from their own. Labourism 
to use Ralph Miliband’s description, ‘is not like Marxism, an ideology of rupture, but an ideology of 
adaptation’.22 In this Paper’s view, this distinct difference in praxis, along with the Labour 
movements overall lack of a ‘systematic body of thought’, allowed Labourism to easily present itself 
                                                          
18 Macintyre, S. (1980). Little Moscows: Communism and Working-Class Militancy in Inter-War Britain. Croon 
Helm: London. 
19 Harker, B. (2011). 'Communism is English': Edgell Rickword, Jack Lindsay and the Cultural Politics of the 
Popular Front. Literature and History.20:2. & Croft, A. (1998). A Weapon in the Struggle: The Cultural History of 
the Communist Party in Britain. Pluto Press. 
20 Ward, P. (1998). Red Flag and Union Jack: Englishness, Patriotism and the British Left, 1881-1924. The Royal 
Historical Society. Boydell Press: Suffolk. 
21 Ibid: p.5. 
22 Miliband, R. (1983). Class Power and State Power. Verso: London.pp.292/293. 
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as coterminous with a British identity, unlike the Communists – whose issue became appearing 
‘naturally’ British in character, rather than a ‘foreign’ infiltration. 
The CPGB’s turn towards a ‘nationalist’ form of politics is illustrative of the prevailing political 
culture, not only on the left in the mid-to-late 1930s, but also within wider-British society, as the 
Party claimed an organicity and sense of self-worth in representing the ‘real’ interests of the British 
people. However, whether this platform was as influential, and authentic as they presented will be 
examined during this essay. Indeed, many of the Trotskyist school of historians, most notably 
represented by Alan Campbell and John McIlroy, have forcefully argued that the CPGB betrayed its 
revolutionary stature during the ‘Popular Front’ years (1935-onwards) and became nothing more 
than a ‘Stalinist imprint’ within. According to this view, and whilst not entirely the focus of this study, 
the Party were at the whims of Moscow’s demands. The Comintern, was therefore a body which 
through financial and political support, effectively steered the political policies of national parties, 
such as the CPGB.23 Their position, is drawn from an understanding that the Soviet Union dominated 
national Parties, ‘as indigenous factors did not influence policy, they influenced implementation.’24 It 
is therefore clear in their view, that national particularities were merely a guise, chosen solely for the 
purpose of following Moscow’s international objectives.  
Recently however, a revisionist school of historians, initially led by historians who were sympathetic, 
or in some way affiliated to the Party, have presented the partnership between the CPGB and the 
Comintern as an un-equal one. Eric Hobsbawm, has powerfully argued that whilst the ‘Popular Front’ 
era marked ‘a change of policy deeper than any the Comintern had undergone before’, claims of the 
Party’s ‘subordination’ to Moscow are hollow, as they understood that ‘the priority of defending and 
                                                          
23 Campbell, J. & McIlroy, A. (2005). A Peripheral Vision: Communist Historiography in Britain. American 
Communist History. 4:2. p.130. & Eaden, J. & Renton, D. (2002). The Communist Party of Great Britain since 
1920. Palgrave: New York. 
24 Laybourn, K. (2005). A Comment on the Historiography of Communism in Britain. American Communist 
History. 4:2. p.163. 
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strengthening the USSR was accepted above all else’.25 In-fact, whilst much of the initial history of 
the CPGB was centred towards portraying the Party as nothing more than a Soviet satellite, 
historians such as Andrew Thorpe and Matthew Worley, have offered what has become the most 
nuanced analysis of the Party’s relationship with the Comintern. 26 Thorpe admits that whilst the 
Soviet Union ultimately had the final say, the ‘lines were often vague and somewhat open to 
interpretation, as the farther democratic centralism stretched, the harder it became to 
implement’.27  
Much recent research has dealt with this question, as historians have questioned how much 
autonomy the CPGB enjoyed. John McIlroy has argued that the Comintern steered its constituent 
parties to ‘authentically project patriotism and populism to reflect national interests and traditions, 
under the guise of more autonomy’.28 And whilst other historians, including both Trotskyists and 
anti-communists have argued that the Party was effectively told to tow a particular line at any given 
moment, the Party’s autonomy, or lack of, is irrelevant in this case. In this author’s view, the 
relationship between the Comintern and the CPGB is largely a footnote for this study. The rhetoric of 
all Parties across the globe emphasized their national uniqueness, for even if we take Smith’s 
premise that ‘national leaders had limited scope for agency, primarily in adapting the general line to 
local circumstances’, the ‘line’ in this case became consumed by the national question. 29 As whilst, 
some may argue that this relationship is crucial in understanding the Party’s shift towards a form of 
politics based upon a resurgent national and collective identity, its implementation was carried out 
                                                          
25 Hobsbawm, E.J. (1986). The Moscow Line and International Communist Policy 1933-1947. In Wrigley, C (ed.). 
Warfare, Diplomacy and Politics: Essays in Honour of A.J.P. Taylor. Hamish Hamilton: London.pp.164-168. 
26 Callaghan, J. (2001). Laybourn, K. & Murphy, D. (1999). Under the Red Flag. Sutton Publishing: Stroud. 
International Review of Social History. 46.p.274. 
27 Thorpe, A. (2000). The British Communist Party and Moscow 1920-1943. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press.p.11.  
28 McIlroy, J. (2013). Restoring Stalinism to Communist History. Critique. 41:4. p.610. 
29 Smith, S. A. Issues in Comintern Historiography cited in Smith, S.A. (2014). The Oxford Handbook of the 
History of Communism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.p.195. 
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with the vigour of a Party which was playing to its strengths – meaning any ‘influence’ is disguised at 
best.  
The second chapter of this thesis will follow the CPGB’s relationship with India and the country’s 
Communist Party, the CPI. Most notably, the historical debate surrounds whether the Party 
effectively ‘did enough’ on the Indian issue. Alongside secondly, the Party’s ever-evolving view on 
Empire and imperialism. It has been the focus of vociferous debate, particularly from Marika 
Sherwood, who claimed that the CPGB were, despite their revolutionary credentials, ‘imbued with 
the same racist prejudices as the rest of the population’. 30 The colonies, nor the colonials were high 
on the aims of the Party, she continued.31 It received much criticism on release, as John Callaghan, 
author of an autobiography on the CPGB’s most senior Indian figure, Rajani Palme Dutt, responded 
in a later comment piece. 32 That said, most historians have presented the Party’s work in a more 
positive light. Noreen Branson, one of the above-mentioned Party historians placed the CPGB ‘at the 
forefront of the battles for colonial freedom’, particularly during a period in which racial prejudices 
and Eurocentric indifference - including on the left - reigned supreme.33  
More recently, Satnam Virdee’s work has placed the CPGB at the ‘centre of most organised 
campaigns against imperialism and racism’. 34 Whilst internationally, the Comintern has been 
highlighted as ‘perhaps the era’s sole international white-led movement to adopt an avowedly anti-
racist platform’. 35 Nonetheless, what has been generally concluded is that the Party’s activism for 
anti-imperialism ebbed in the mid-1930s. Consequently, much of the Party’s anti-imperialist focus 
has been placed on the periods either side of the ‘Popular Front’, as this is where their campaigning 
                                                          
30 Sherwood, M. (1996). The CPGB, the Colonial Question and Black Britons, 1920-1938. Science & Society. 
60:2. p.160. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Callaghan, J. (1997). Colonies, Racism, the CPGB and the Comintern in the Inter-War Years. Science and 
Society. 61: 4. 
33 Branson, N. (1985). History of the Communist Party of Great Britain: 1927-1941. p.337. 
34 Virdee, S. (2014). Racism, Class and the Racialized Outsider. Palgrave Macmillan: London. p.89. 
35 Adi, H. (2009). The Negro Question: The Communist International and Black Liberation in the Interwar Years. 
University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill.p.155. 
14 
 
was at its most obvious, as shown by the Meerut Affair and the prevalence of the League against 
Imperialism (LAI). In-fact, A.J. Mackenzie went so far as to say that after the Seventh World 
Congress, little attention was paid to anti-imperialism in the Comintern whatsoever, with the 
direction of the Indian movement largely left in the hands of the CPGB.36 One particularly useful 
piece of scholarship has been Evan Smiths’ work on the Party’s Afro-Caribbean membership 
following the Second World War, as well as his recent book, British Communism: The Politics of 
Race.37 Smith proposes that the post-war era was based upon, a one-sided fraternal relationship, 
which was ‘centred on British needs and wants, rather than on what the newly liberated countries 
would desire’.38 Anti-colonialism he continues, was an important issue for the CPGB, but it was a 
‘foreign concept to most white members, who were predominantly concerned with immediate 
domestic matters.’ 39 His book remains crucial in re-situating the Party’s politics within the 
overarching political atmosphere of race, national identity and class politics, as well as its successes 
and failures in anti-imperialist activism.  
No work on the Party’s anti-imperialist activism, or on India would be complete without John 
Callaghan’s research, as it remains indispensable for any looking at the Party’s role in forming anti-
imperialist bodies and movements. 40 His perceptive argument remains key in any understanding of 
the Party’s role during the period, as he places its campaigning and overall position within the 
broader political climate, both at a national, and international level. He writes: 
The real context of the Party’s anti-colonialism between the wars is better gauged when it is 
remembered that ‘almost all British writers in this period believed that social and economic 
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advance [in the colonies] must precede political independence’…as the dominant 
Eurocentric assumptions of social evolution and racial hierarchy permeated throughout.41 
In relation to India, and the wider international context, the Comintern’s numerous shifts in thinking 
are relevant, and undoubtedly had their effects upon indigenous movements success. However, in 
the late 1930s, the CPGB did undoubtedly have more autonomy on certain issues; so long as they 
effectively campaigned for Spain, disseminated anti-fascist propaganda and attempted broader 
populist alliances. As whereas in 1924, the Comintern complained that the CPGB had ‘done as good 
as nothing’ in the colonies, the CI were less inclined to entice the Party to step-up its anti-colonial 
work in the Popular Front period, given the immediate threat of fascism.42  National Parties were 
largely left on their own, as anti-colonialist activism became an issue engaged with by individual 
members, as opposed to Parties. In fact, the ‘Popular Front’ has been largely criticised by many 
historians for its lack of constructive anti-imperialism. For example, Neil Redfern has argued that 
whilst there was evidence in party circulars, letters, and meetings of anti-imperial thinking, there 
was relatively little evidence of anti-imperialist activism in the wider membership following 1935. He 
goes onto state that anti-imperial work was put on the backburner in favour of all anti-fascist work, 
which to some degree meant ‘subordinating anti-colonial work for the British national interest’. 43  
It is an assessment this work largely agrees with, however, there are to be found some subtle 
differences. For example, Redfern places the blame in the hands of the Comintern for initiating this 
shift. However, this fails to appreciate the indigenous national factors that overwhelmingly dictated 
much of the Party’s language around the nation and the defence of its borders. The CPGB were 
implementing a policy which they were happy to follow – after all, anti-imperialism was never a 
dominant concern for much of the Party’s membership, whilst nods towards a nascent cultural spirit 
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was where Pollitt and others, not only felt most comfortable, but thrived. That said not all 
assessments have been negative. For example, Jean Jones has noted that the sheer amount of 
material brought before the Central Committee ‘testifies to the seriousness with which the work was 
conducted’. 44 Whilst, John Callaghan has argued that the Party’s involvement in creating many 
Indian organisations, shows that the Indian question was of interest in a climate of broader 
indifference.45 Meanwhile, recent scholars, such as Satnam Virdee and Evan Smith have argued that 
whilst the ‘Popular Front’ meant ‘anti-imperialism and anti-racism was increasingly side-lined’, 
within the rhetoric of worldwide anti-fascism - the issue did not entirely go away. 46 Tom Buchanan’s 
recent article, The Dark Millions, analyses the labour movement’s tussles between anti-imperialism 
and anti-fascism in the Popular Front years, concluding that in-fact, ‘anti-fascism might be thought of 
as, in a sense, antithetical to anti-imperialism’. 47 For Buchanan, it was clear that the mainstream 
Labour movement’s placing of anti-imperialism on the ‘back burner’ did little to address colonial 
concerns, and in many instances lost much of the good faith built up by organisations such as the 
LAI. 48 His analysis demonstrates the pervasiveness of this thinking across the entire British left in the 
run up to the Second World War, which shows that the CPGB were following a much wider trend 
towards Eurocentrism. 
In addition, individual Party member histories have been a fascinating access point to historians, in 
particular, John Callaghan’s autobiography of Rajani Palme Dutt, and Kevin Morgan’s Pollitt. In Dutt’s 
case, it is not surprising that India and the ‘colonial question’ figured so prominently in his analysis; 
he was after all, half-Indian. 49 Dutt was immensely knowledgeable of the Indian situation, writing 
numerous pieces in what was essentially his own periodical, the Labour Monthly, as well the 
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significant India Today in 1940, which offered the first Marxist examination of British imperialist 
policy in India.50 Dutt’s ideological stamp on the Party was absolute, and no serious study of the 
Party’s anti-imperialist views would be complete without him. 51 His interest in the Indian situation 
continued during the ‘Popular Front’, as Callaghan suggests that Dutt became even more active 
following his return to Britain in 1936.52 After all, he was the President of the Indian Political 
Conference, and was at the forefront of any Indian commentary, holding a unique and politically 
astute opinion on Indian self-determination, which his reputation as a ‘Stalinist apparatchik’ does 
not entertain. Interestingly, it appears Dutt resembled more autonomy and ‘freedom of thought’ on 
India, than he did on any other issue, for he attacked both socialists who opposed ‘mere 
nationalism’, as well as nationalists who neglected the social question, positing instead that unless 
the struggle was directed against both British imperialism, and the Indian domestic class structure, 
there would be no real independence for India.53  
Kevin Morgan’s, Against Fascism and War has been an excellent source for this study, as he notes 
the lack of attention paid to imperialism by the Party. For Morgan, imperialism was rarely diffused or 
elucidated upon, but understood as something which could be ended by ‘granting self-
determination to all nations, not of a revolutionary commitment’. 54 Colonial struggles were 
understood as a set of democratic principles to be won and adhered to, as ‘peoples fighting for their 
national freedom, not as front-line fighters to end the capitalist system’.55 It was this particular point 
that appears most relevant to this study, as the CPGB, following the line of the Comintern, regarded 
revolutionary struggles within the national scope, rather than as part of a broader internationalist 
fight to overthrow capitalism. Imperialism became a buzzword, applied when the situation 
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necessitated, rather than a conscious ideological category. Baring this in mind, it is no surprise that 
the Popular Front has been regarded in some circles, as the bedrock for the ultimate abolition of the 
Comintern in 1943, and with it, international revolution.56 
In regards to the Comintern and the Party’s relation with the Indian Communist Party, Gupta has 
questioned ‘Western scholarship’ that the line charge was down to ‘opportunism’ on the part of the 
Soviet Union, and was a ‘virtual betrayal of the national liberation movement in the colonies’.57 He 
instead argues that in the colonies, where the anti-imperialist line was ‘most necessary’, the 
Comintern ‘was most emphatic on defending proletarian hegemony’, most notably in the anti-
imperialist united front. He continues that it would be a ‘complete travesty’ to suggest that the anti-
imperialist was ‘eclipsed by the struggle against fascism’, given that they ‘arose out of two entirely 
different political situations’. 58 In the colonies, the Popular Front permitted a substantial re-think, 
following a period of sectarianism and relative marginality. Organisations such as the LAI, long-since 
discarded by the Labour Party as a ‘Communist front’, required the creation of ‘populist’ 
organisations, which would allow Labour Party members to become involved. According to one 
historian, working with nationalist forces ‘transformed the fortunes of the CPI’ from 1935. 59 The key 
difference lay in the labour movement, as unlike in Britain, where the established trade union and 
labour movements were entrenched fixtures, India was relatively weaker, allowing leftists the 
opportunity to infiltrate the nationalist movements, before becoming their revolutionary vanguard.  
It was as Wang-Ming expressed at the 1935 congress, ‘both within and without the National 
Congress’ the CPI’s duty to ‘consolidate all the genuine anti-imperialist forces of the country, 
broadening and leading the struggle of the masses against the imperialist oppressors’.60  
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That said, the Communist colonial policy during the Popular Front years has not been without 
criticism. For example, numerous historians of the Global South have placed blame on the 
Comintern for their ‘one size fits all policy’ on anti-imperialism.61 For as Gupta has described, the CPI, 
were as wounded by totalizing line-changes as any:  
The Communist Party of India had to suffer too often for failing to take lessons from the 
experiences of the past and deviating from the above positions, leading to alternate spells of 
reformism and sectarianism.62 
The ‘problem with the line was that it was inflexible’, according to Prashad, unable to cater towards 
national demands or particularities, despite the good will the organisation garnered. 63 Singer goes 
further, viewing external pressures from the Comintern, alongside internal disputes, as derailing the 
Indian left, from undertaking an effective agrarian politics during the 1930s.64 Therefore, the hope of 
this work is to demonstrate that the Indian question was relegated to a post-war phenomenon in 
much of the CPGB’s activity. As whilst there is evidence that the Party campaigned for ‘Indian issues’, 
it was certainly not regarded as an immediate issue. Crucially, however, the Party’s ‘indifference’ to 
the colonies during the Popular Front is only perceived as such, when contrasted with much of the 
stellar work they did previously – for the Party held lofty ambitions, they could never realistically 
maintain – particularly, as they were now committed, rightly or wrongly, to a ‘Popular Front’ 
programme. Indeed, the lack of comment from the Party is as much ‘evidence’, as it is if they had 
produced masses of material, for though absence does not mean apathy, many senior figures, 
including Pollitt, may not have been as concerned with the ‘colonial campaign’ in that time and place 
as Dutt and others would have wished. As Kevin Morgan has suggested, Empire was never a 
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prevailing concern for Pollitt. 65 Pollitt’s key political instincts were after all ‘hatred of fascism, 
devotion to the Soviet Union and leftist patriotism’. 66 It is worthwhile to remember that both the 
CPGB’s position, as well as the CPI’s anxieties were not only driven by the demands of the Comintern 
and international communist opinion, but also by the personal hopes and desires of the people who 
ran the Party. For instance, the Party’s emphasis on Spain, reflected not only Pollitt’s own 
connection to the issue, but the tangible fascist threat in mainland Europe; whilst his relative apathy 
on India is reflected, not only in Dutt’s campaigning appearing out of the ordinary, but his relative 
indifference to the colonies, alongside European fascism.  
As such, it is in this Paper’s view, a task of analysing how the Party attempted to reflect ‘national 
values’; its position in the broader political culture, (and if it at all influenced it), along with finally, 
whether it was readily accepted, and indeed ‘national’ in scope - rather than its failure to create a 
Socialist British Republic. Alongside, internationally, whether the Party’s ‘anti-imperialism’ became 
an extension of this nationalist outlook at home, putting ‘British interests’ first, or whether anti-
imperialism could co-exist alongside an aggressive, ostensibly English patriotism. 
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Chapter I: For Country, For Class: Patriotism and the CPGB. 
 
It is necessary in each country to investigate, study, and ascertain the national peculiarities; 
the specific national features of fascism and map out accordingly the effective methods and 
forms of struggle against it…we must not hesitate even to learn from the enemy, if that will 
help us quickly and more effectively wring his neck. 67 
Dimitrov’s speech was a call to arms for Communists to change tack in response to the rise of 
continental fascism. It was an existential threat to the existence of the Soviet Union, the only socialist 
state, and an alliance with bourgeois parties was a complete volte-face from the militant sectarianism 
of the ‘Third Period’. This chapter will argue that Dimitrov’s assertion that all parties should 
‘ascertain national particularities’ was not necessarily a tough prospect for the CPGB to entertain. 
After all, Harry Pollitt felt that his socialism was distinctly of the English variety, despite his 
prevailing loyalties to internationalism and the Soviet project. The Party became an unofficial 
mouthpiece of reformism and progressive social progress. As Noreen Branson has explained, the 
Party’s focus was to ‘transform and democratise the state machine, not to replace it.’68 The CPGB’s 
relationship with social democracy was tenuous at best. After all, its move towards conciliation with 
the labour movement was largely due to broader international considerations; specifically, the Soviet 
Union’s policy of ‘collective security’ with mainland Europe. The Party’s shift towards firstly an 
‘United Front’ and soon after a ‘Popular Front’ was driven by two main factors, one from above, from 
the Soviet Union – and the other, from the experiences the ‘Class against Class’ period fostered 
within.69 There was a drive, particularly from Harry Pollitt and others to ally themselves with the 
Labour Party, and become in-essence, a pressure group to determine Labour policy.  
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The growth of fascism necessitated a re-think in Communist theory, prompting a turn in attitudes 
towards democracy, the mainstream Labour movement and a reworking of how social progress would 
occur. R.P.Dutt summed up the position in Labour Monthly in 1937, signalling that ‘the whole fight 
for democracy against fascism has taken on a deeper meaning in present conditions, and has become 
in unity with the fight for peace, the key expression of the present stage of social struggle.’ 70 Post-
1935, the Party claimed to champion a movement which they themselves stood outside of, articulating 
an innate English radical history with the CP as its logical forerunners. For whilst the Party may not 
have had any real claim to frame themselves as the gatekeepers of ‘English’ working-class history 
and ideals, these ‘ideals’ are both historically and thematically abstract, transient and open to 
interpretation. After all, the anxieties the Labour Party had over non-intervention, appeasement, and 
Nazi Germany meant a Party on the left could easily position itself as the forerunners of a ‘nationalist’ 
anti-fascist Party.  
This view of a ‘nationalist’ CPGB is not a view imposed by historians however, but one entertained 
by both Party critics and members, questioned most famously by George Orwell. In his words, the 
‘Popular Front’ evoked visions of ‘the nauseous spectacle of bishops, communists, duchesses and 
Labour MPs marching arm in arm to the tune of Rule Britannia’. 71 Unsurprisingly, the Labour Party 
and the Trade Union movement were visibly irritated by the CPGB’s numerous attempts at affiliation 
and calls for support in Spanish Republican aid, with Walter Citrine calling for the Party to ‘please let 
us manage our own affairs’. 72 They were regarded as a ‘negligible quantity’ and a Party whose 
motives, quite understandably, seemed up for debate given the Party’s haphazard line changes.73 
These seismic changes in party rhetoric did have their successes however, for example, the Party’s 
membership did quadruple between 1935 and 1939, (peaking at around 56,000 during the war) whilst 
greater united front initiatives amongst the left, at least at a local level, had a degree of success.74 And 
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whilst, the Party and the Comintern may have said otherwise, there is no doubt that as war creeped 
closer, the Party did become less typically Communist in rhetoric.  
The ‘Popular Front’ found the CPGB attempting to claim an oppositional ‘Englishness’ for their own, 
in contrast to the ‘bourgeois’ patriotism of the Conservatives, and to a lesser extent the Labour Party. 
It was not necessarily a radical call, but Pollitt was adamant that for ‘too long we have let the rich 
pretend the country was only theirs, that when we said Britain, we meant them’.75 Patriotism was not a 
value to be sneered at, as Dimitrov emphasised at the Seventh World Congress, but to be catered to. 76 
They were well aware of the political potential in a patriotic, left-wing party, as the CPGB defined 
patriotism as someone ‘who loves their country, who would defend it from attack; who is proud to be 
a Britisher, and of the history and great traditions of the British people’.77 What the country was, and 
who truly represented it, became a kind of raison d'être for the Party in this period, as the battle for 
Britain had begun. The Party sought to position themselves as the antithesis to the National 
Government’s ‘proto-fascism’, as they complained that ‘all the papers have been telling you for years 
that the Communists hate their country, that we are the very reverse of patriotic. Yet we do love our 
country, and we are proud of the British people.’78 ‘The press has been proved wrong’, R.P. Arnot 
announced. 79 Instead, the Party were the arbiters of reason, anti-fascism and national (class) interests, 
drawing bold distinctions between those who were tarnishing Britain’s name, and those who fought 
for it. Of course, this was nothing new, as nations are both inclusive and exclusive political entities, 
meaning the Party could easily draw boundaries between those imagined as ‘British’ – and those not. 
In the case of the CPGB, the National Government and its ‘vested interests’ became the ‘outsider’, as 
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they had abandoned the nation, meaning it was up to the Communists to take up that mantle and fight 
for its ‘real’ interests. Yet in a manner illustrative of the Party’s evolution, the CPGB’s brand of 
‘patriotism’ did not call for an overthrow of the capitalist system; it did not even call for working-
class emancipation or representation, rather it sought to present the working class and the British 
people as one of the same, united in one struggle. 
The Power of ‘Popular Conviction’80 
Communism and Early-British radicalism were intimately tied forces, and conveniently, the Party 
were the torch carriers of this bold ‘English tradition’. In this paper’s view, the Party successfully 
presented the two as synonymous, regardless of its historical authenticity– and were very much, using 
Geoffrey Field’s work, a ‘social patriot’ Party. Field sketches the differences between patriotism’s 
‘social’ and ‘radical’ expressions and posits that ‘radical patriotism’ delineates clearly between the 
state and the ‘people’, meaning the radical patriot sees the prevailing social structure as a politically 
dead machine, beyond repair and ultimately their ‘national loyalty’. 81 In contrast, ‘social patriotism’ 
is the belief that a new form of nationhood can be devised given the right conditions, as the state is 
itself, a vehicle for gradual social transformation. It is as Field notes, ‘an inwardly focused patriotism, 
one that is orientated towards social reform, and implies some kind of new and improved Britain’ 
without revolutionizing its landscape and political structure(s). 82 Therefore, using Field’s framework, 
this paper has understood the CPGB’s move towards patriotic sentiments as an example of ‘social 
patriotism’, rather than an attempt to immediately revolutionize the existing social status-quo.  
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Paul Ward’s study of the mainstream British Left in the early nineteenth century has demonstrated 
that ‘British socialism must ultimately take its place alongside other invented traditions…as Labour 
politics revolved around identities of nation as well as class’, which were not static but under constant 
re-definition.83 The type of nationalism which emerged in the late nineteenth century emphasised 
paradoxically, loyalty not to the ‘country’ but only to a particular version of that country: to an 
ideological construct. 84 After all, Clement Atlee’s comment that the Labour Party was ‘socialism 
adapted to British conditions’ is an easily expanded view to fit the broader British left, in varying 
degrees and periods. 85 For whilst it is conventional to assume that Marxism and nationalism are 
incompatible - which is a debate that still rages to this day; in this period the distinction was less 
obvious. Nationalism has provided Marxists ‘an uncomfortable anomaly’ and has been ‘largely 
elided, rather than confronted’ according to Benedict Anderson. 86 Tom Nairn, has taken a similar 
view, writing that ‘the theory of nationalism represents Marxism’s greatest historical failure’. 87 As 
Geoffrey Field has summarised, much of historic leftist theory on the nation dealt with the question of 
whether ‘patriotism can be rescued for the left, or if its imperial and class associations must always 
undermine its positive, democratic aspects’. 88  
It would be hard, given the rise of continental fascism and an understandably hesitant left to disagree 
with this assessment, for the CPGB attempted to haphazardly co-opt certain historical ideals, which 
are intrinsic to the national state, and particularly the imagined ‘British nation’. If we follow Benedict 
Anderson’s suggestion that the nation is an ‘imagined political community’, which is to its core, ‘both 
inherently sovereign and politically limited’. 89 There is consequently, not one totalizing ‘British’ 
history, and neither is there an unequivocal sense of ‘Britishness’, but rather many competing 
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histories; some forgotten, some supressed and some more prominent than they perhaps deserve. For 
whilst, national identity is a by-product of nations, national identity is ‘sovereign’ in of itself, meaning 
it is also interchangeable with varying political beliefs and ideologies. It is therefore no surprise the 
CPGB attempted to establish itself firmly in a ‘British mode of thinking’ when firstly, it had so much 
political resonance, and secondly, provided the CPGB with an opportunity to, follow Gellner’s turn of 
phrase, do what all nations do, and ‘invent nations where they did not previously exist’. 90 It is worth 
remembering that nations are continually in a state of flux, being both a theoretical construct and a 
real tangible entity. Hence, there remains the problem, both for nations and political organisations to 
authentically reflect/and or create what are perceived as national values. As the 19th century Italian, 
Massimo d’Azeglio infamously stated: ‘We have made Italy. Now we must make the Italians’.91  
The study of ‘Britishness’ has long dealt with this question, as national identity, nor ‘Britishness’ is an 
easily identifiable phenomenon. Paul Ward’s understanding of Britishness, as something best 
understood, at the base level - as something individuals collectively identify with, and subsequently 
reinforce is vital for any understanding of national identity. 92 Its transient nature, across boundaries of 
class, race and gender has meant that Britishness has always been a formative creed. Nations are after 
all, ‘caught, uncertainly, in the act of composing’ themselves.93 It would be therefore unfair, when 
discussing the CPGB’s own nationalist turn to not place it within our broader understanding of 
‘Britishness’ - particularly as many contemporary observers downplayed the CPGB and the BUF as 
‘un-British’ in character. Though largely discredited, initial historiography dismissed their ‘extreme’ 
nature as an outlier to ‘traditional British values’ of common decency and moderation.94 It is correct, 
as Andrew Thorpe has written, that ‘generalisations about the national character are probably best left 
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out of consideration when discussing the failure of political extremism’. 95 Nonetheless, it is clear that 
appearing ‘British’ and in-tune with the real national character has power in its own right, as whilst 
‘failure did not stem from an innate Britishness that favoured moderation, it does suggest the strength 
in the construction of Britishness’.96 Subsequently, crucial to this study, for all of the CPGB’s 
attempts to create an ‘oppositional’ patriotism, their efforts did inevitably embrace the very same 
language and political action as those that regarded their very existence as ‘non-British’.  
The nation did not initially figure prominently in conventional Marxism, as key figures tended to view 
the state in the capitalist phase of development as engendering alienation from the broader class-
struggle. The orthodox position held that the ‘nation’ was a bastion against social progress, which 
harboured ‘reactionary’ or as Lenin described, inherently ‘social chauvinist’ values. 97 For whilst 
Marx, famously coined that ‘the working men have no country’, national sentiments still not only 
existed in the 1930s, but thrived, as ‘national differences and antagonisms between peoples’ were not 
as he had hoped, ‘vanishing daily’.98 Dimitrov’s statement at the Seventh World Congress was 
therefore, not so much a break with historic Communist theory, as many previously thought. Eric 
Hobsbawm has suggested that whilst the Popular Front was the most divisive ‘turn’ in Communist 
history, it did have its own historical foundations, particularly in the ‘social patriot’ line many 
European socialists took on the eve of the First World War.99 Even in the immediate aftermath of the 
October Revolution, Lenin noted in June 1920, that it is the Communists’ ‘duty to make certain 
concessions’ [to the nation] in the hope of ‘eradicating the above-mentioned prejudices as quickly as 
possible’, but crucially to not cater to ‘national egoism’.100 Instead he suggested, that the task lay in 
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‘applying the main principles of communism to the peculiar relations between classes, and to the 
peculiar features…that are obsessed in every country’ which should be studied, found and solved. 101  
Of course, what these ‘features’ were was entirely up for debate, as were what the ‘nation’ was, or 
whom it sought to represent. Nations were understood as unique fixtures, which could be utilised as 
an instrument in the broader social struggle, not simply as an obstruction against broader international 
class solidarity. Antonio Gramsci, the great Marxist theorist, agreed, commenting in his Prison 
Notebooks, that the ‘internal relations of any nation are the result of a combination which is original 
and in a certain sense, unique’.102 In this sense, the prevailing Communist theorists of the period were 
fully aware of the staying power of the nation-state, and its heightened political relevancy. The 
idiosyncrasies of each nation were not to be ignored, but accommodated to, and the Comintern 
followed this line. ‘British exceptionalism’ as it was coined, was just one strand of the supposed ‘free-
reign’ national parties had in determining party policy. ‘British particularities’ on the ‘United Front’, 
was one example of the ‘new autonomy’ constituent parties gained, as the Party complained that 
‘regard should be made to our circumstances here’. 103  
As Michael Billig has written, ‘the voice of nationalism’ is hegemonic, claiming an 'identity of 
identities’. Consequently, nationalism is not necessarily as inwardly orientated as we are to believe, 
but all-encompassing too. For example, if we take the CPGB as an example; the Party was attempting 
to be an authentic Communist Party, but also a populist, reformist, and ‘patriotic’ force too. And 
whilst political parties are not beholden to one singular ideology, the CPGB’s shift towards 
representing the ‘nation’ in all of its varying currents and political opinion demonstrates Billig’s 
presence of a ‘syntax of hegemony’ over identities. 104 As a result, national symbols were open to be 
‘reclaimed’ across the continent, just as the working-classes were to re-establish their position within 
the nation itself. National symbols are perhaps the most striking example of nationhood and national 
identity, given they are so easily recognisable, especially when accounting for their varying 
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connotations. Joan of Arc is arguably the greatest example, as she has in various periods been co-
opted as a sign of innate ‘French spirit’. Her usage, by the proto-fascist Vichy government, the liberal 
Third Republic, or even the Communist PCF - most usually as an embattled heroine fighting an 
occupying force, demonstrates the flexibility of political symbols.  
In the CPGB’s case, one particularly interesting instance was mentioned during a debate in the House 
of Commons in March 1937, where attention was drawn to a poster in London ‘showing the device of 
the hammer and sickle superimposed upon a crucifix’.105 Whilst the YCL claimed no responsibility 
for the poster, calling it ‘a complete and clumsy misrepresentation’, and a failed smear attempt by the 
fascists, problems of authenticity are unlikely to detract from the question that the Party needed to 
broaden its appeal, meaning no potential stone was left untouched.106 It recognized that religious 
ideals would resonate with many on the left, as it always had. For example, one appeal for aid to 
Spain, emphasised that the acts being carried out by Franco’s Fascists were not indicative of Catholics 
based in England, as the Party stressed that ‘we are sure this is not YOUR idea of Christianity!’.107 
And whilst at first glance this link between socialism and Christianity appears ludicrous, it is not as 
absurd as one may think: Philip Snowden in his famous lecture coined the triumph of socialism as The 
Christ That Is to Be, whilst Conrad Noel, better known as the ‘Red Vicar of Thaxted’, was a founding 
member of the British Socialist Party, which later became the CPGB. 108 Although, Kenneth Leech 
has argued that Noel’s brand of socialism ‘owed more to William Morris and the romantic and 
utopian traditions than Marx’, Noel’s strong support of the Soviet Union and communist politics 
demonstrates a potential overlapping of socialism with both religion and the nation-state, at least on 
an individual level. 109 In-fact, J.R. Campbell noted in a 1938 Daily Worker column that there was no 
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reason why a Christian could not join the CP, signifying the Party’s broad-church approach to fight 
fascism.110 
In this sense, the CPGB were following the pre-war tradition of socialism, which was based on 
‘historical precedent’, in which social progress was firmly rooted in references to the past. 111 For it 
did not matter whether the CPGB had any claim to present themselves as one with Christianity, other 
than that they claimed to do so – for the fact that they claimed they were, gave them some degree of 
legitimacy. Gramsci emphasised the necessity of catering to these national particularities in a later 
piece, noting that ‘to be sure, the development is towards internationalism – but the point of departure 
is national’. 112 International Communist policy was unified in the delicate task of understanding the 
importance of the nation-state, as they dismissed accusations of nationalism if they referred to the 
perceived, nucleus of the question. Despite regional emphasises, in the cases of Keir Hardie, Philip 
Snowden, or even Rajani Palme Dutt’s connection with India, it must be noted, that ‘Britain’ and 
‘England’ were largely conflated as one and the same. It was not an uncommon assimilation, and one 
which purveyed the entire political spectrum, as Conservative Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin let the 
term ‘England’ speak for the entirety of Britain. 113 England was the unrivalled source of national 
identity, both blurring and homogenising, regional and national identities into a whole. Indeed, the 
Party’s emphasis on a national identity predicated on an ‘English radical history’, showcased the 
Party’s lack of interest in the Scottish and Welsh nationalisms, as scant attention was placed on the 
Scottish and Welsh questions during this period. 114 England, alone, became the focus of their 
oppositional national identity, as the Party’s Englishness was built in opposition to the ‘Britishness’ of 
Empire and capital.115  
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Eternal England. 
Nostalgia for an eternal England, where the virtues of freedom, democracy, and social progress would 
once again prosper, were rife in CPGB thinking. However, the concept of an enduring, ultimately 
hidden virtue with the possibility of rediscovery is far from unusual, and is by no means unique to 
England.116 The CPGB understood the importance of collective identity, though crucially, it was not 
in the vein Stuart Macintyre declared in his pioneering work, Little Moscow’s. 117 Instead, proletarian 
internationalism was officially placed on the backburner in favour of a populist, working-class 
patriotism. For the CPGB, they framed that following a period of ‘social chauvinism’ and bourgeois 
patriotism, the prospect of building on concealed ‘British values’ meant the potential for, as Pollitt 
enthusiastically exclaimed, ‘reason to prevail in Britain!’. 118 The arrival of ‘reason’ to Britain would 
prompt a move towards ‘economic security, peace, democracy, and finally socialism’.119 This 
reworking of the conventional Marxist doctrine of class struggle, towards peaceful co-existence with a 
new, revitalised form of democracy was a startling example of the party’s understanding of history – 
as the vehicles of social progress had changed substantially. Previously, the working classes alone 
(give or take the Labour Party’s inclusion) were to act in the Leninist vanguardism tradition, however, 
now the matter relied on creating a ‘people’s government’ formed by a wider range of opinion – who 
would stem the tide of fascism, and return to society to order, prosperity and liberal values.  
Pollitt himself, was the obvious example of this distinctly English stance. ‘As English as a Lancashire 
Rose or oak’ was how Rajani Palme Dutt described his sometimes comrade, sometimes adversary, 
Harry Pollitt. 120 ‘Tough, Lancashire born and bred; downright and without frills’ – he was admired by 
both friends and foes as a terrific public speaker.121 Even the Manchester Guardian, a liberal 
newspaper, which had no desire to present Pollitt as anything more than a Moscow stooge, 
commented in a review of his autobiography Serving My Time as ‘explaining many things, including 
                                                          
116 Aughey, A. (2007). The Politics of Englishness. Manchester University Press: Manchester.p.86. 
117 Macintyre, S. (1980). Little Moscows: Communism and Working-Class Militancy in Inter-War Britain. Croon 
Helm: London. 
118 For Peace and Plenty: Report of the Fifteenth Congress. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Morgan, K. (1993). Pollitt. Manchester University Press: Manchester.p.111. 
121 “Mr Pollitt”. Manchester Guardian. March 29th, 1940. 
33 
 
Mr Pollitt’s Englishness in spite of the Soviet Union’, describing him as ‘the best exponent of British 
communism’.122 To some degree, Pollitt’s sense of ‘Englishness’ can be relayed back to his political 
upbringing, as well as his own personal style; for as Morgan has suggested, whereas Pollitt relied on 
‘gut feelings, Dutt relied on doctrinal athleticism’. 123 It was an issue of what was best for the 
working-classes then and now, rather than any strict adherence to Marxism. For he was never overly 
competent with Marxist theory, and even in his Labour Monthly articles, rarely articulated Marxist 
terms or concepts, other than in passing. Instead, he focused on the ‘real’ issues of the day, whether 
that be working conditions, the means test, or the occasional anti-war protest, as opposed to incessant 
rewording of communist theory. It was where his strengths lay, and his comfortableness with 
campaigning for Spain and against anti-fascism, at home and abroad, within a distinctly ‘English 
Socialism’ meant he thrived, just as the Party’s support swelled.  
Of course, Pollitt was not alone, as British Communism in general, even by Lenin, was regarded as 
being less theoretically inclined.124 In 1938, this was still evidently a problem, as in a pamphlet to 
members regarding the Party’s work since the Seventh World Congress, Pollitt commented that it was 
‘urgently necessary to broaden our educational work’ to gain a ‘better understanding of Marxism-
Leninism’. However, he emphasised that it was ‘not because we are bookworms, but because we want 
it form, guide and help lead the masses in a more effective way’. 125 Precisely because the new period 
was ideologically the most ‘momentous turn’ in the Party’s history meant a realigning of theory and 
praxis. 126 In January 1938, it was deemed essential to ‘scrap old ideas and prejudices’ in the hope of 
attracting new blood to the Party, which would ‘let in a breath of fresh air and blow away the fog of 
doubt and despair’.127 It was clear that memories of the harsh sectarianism of the ‘Third Period’ 
fostered a desire to work within wider civil society, and hopefully transform the Party away from as 
Rust described, ‘a hole in the corner affair’. 128 This idea penetrated the Party, as Hutt in a review of 
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Tom Bell’s history of the Party, titled How Not to Write Communist History, disavowed any thinking 
that viewed them as against the grain. He wrote: 
To isolate the story of CP from that of the British Labour movement as a whole inevitably 
implies a narrow, sectarian approach at a time when a diametrically opposite attitude is 
acutely felt to be essential.129 
Hutt’s review signalled the Party’s evolving view on both their own history; their position within the 
broader labour movement, and the role ‘authentic’ history had to play in any ‘Popular Front’ success. 
It was for Hutt, crucial to position the CPGB as one of the same with the British Labour Movement, 
not just to consolidate their own position, but for the prospects of any successful anti-fascism.  
Spain: Fascism and War. 
The CPGB’s nationalist turn was demonstrated most notably in campaigning for Spain. The Daily 
Worker, forever the boldest and most clear-cut expression of the CPGB, was immediate in its 
declaration that Britain should ‘force the National Government to give assistance to the People’s 
Government of Spain.’ 130 The Party framed the National Government’s non-intervention in Spain as 
both a betrayal of the Spanish people and Britain’s name in global affairs. ‘Whatever was good in 
British traditions…the National Government has abandoned and betrayed…they have added new 
examples of treachery to every infamy that has previously sullied the name of Britain’, Pollitt noted to 
the Party’s National Congress in 1937. 131 The Comintern had tread the path for this nationalist 
thinking at the Seventh World Congress, calling on Parties ‘not to sneer at national sentiments’, but 
the response to the Munich Agreement in 1938 laid bare the responsibilities for the working classes. 
They declared that the bourgeoisie were ‘betraying the national interests’, and as such, it was the 
working class and its Communist Party ‘which takes over the legacies of the bourgeois revolution; 
maintains them against the traitors and develops them to a richer and fuller life’. 132 Nationalism had 
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swamped the institution, as loyalty to the Soviet Union necessitated an uneasy alliance between 
patriotism and defence of its institutions at home, alongside internationalism at the state level. For 
Pollitt, Britain became a nation worth defending, especially as war drew ever closer. It was a matter of 
unleashing what was lying dormant, awaiting revival, and was crucially, not a revolutionary break. He 
envisioned a scenario where a ‘People’s Front’ government could become a barricade against 
continental fascism, just as the Soviet Union had, as Gallacher described the U.S.S.R. as ‘a great, 
powerful country, that stands out as the bulwark of peace in Europe’. 133 Many in the Party understood 
Britain’s interests as intimately intertwined with those of the Soviet Union, hoping for an alliance in 
the pursuit of peace. 134 The Party hoped that the masses would become aware of the ‘betrayals that 
have taken place’ and take up the fight against the likes of the National Government, who had 
smeared the country’s history of radicalism. Gallacher in a speech to the House of Commons called 
for ‘peace forces to be united’, outlining that ‘if Britain had a government that represented the 
peaceful and progressive desires of the people…such a government could form a peace block that 
could stop all aggression’.135  
The National Government were not alone however, as the trade-unions and Labour Party right came 
under attack for their perceived hesitancy in assisting Republican Spain.136 The Party’s approach was 
symptomatic of their new role in British society; attacking the Labour Party for a lack of interest, but 
also in the hope that the Party would support their measures for affiliation. This is shown in both 
Pollitt and Rust’s Spanish accounts, where they highlighted the positive impact Labour Party MPs had 
in Spain. They had created a ‘very big impression’ on the Battalion, as Pollitt continued, ‘there was 
the upmost eagerness to learn what had been the effect of their visit in Britain’. It is clear that 
regardless of the Party’s efforts on the ground, persuading the Labour Party to change course was 
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essential. 137 However, this did not mean that the Labour Party were exempt from blame - in-fact, the 
CPGB’s relationship with the Labour movement over Spain showcased both the Party’s new line in 
action, as well as the lingering partisanship from the ‘Third Period’. Hard-line figures of the Labour 
right came in for the most damage, as they proclaimed that the British Battalion had ‘removed the 
stain from [the labour movements] name placed on it by the Citrines and Bevan’s’ 138 Pollitt scolded 
Walter Citrine, referring to him as a ‘knight of the British empire, a man more concerned with 
capitalists, than the militants in his own union’.139 It was a cause, one friend noted, that ‘was dearest 
to his invincible heart’. 140 And he was under no illusions that more could have been done, as Pollitt 
conceded on his return to Britain in July 1937 - ‘I left Republican Spain with the indelible memories 
of the things I had seen, conscious of how little we have done to help’.141  
Republican Spain had fallen, and to compound it all, the Party had lost numerous members and 
supporters to the cause. It was an issue Pollitt repeatedly quarrelled with, sending numerous letters to 
families, wives and friends back home, telling the Party’s Central Committee that ‘it is astonishing 
how many wives are vehement’ with the Party. 142 Pollitt felt that their sacrifices were not as well 
appreciated as he had hoped, as he asked Dave Springhall, ‘how they can say we are not sincere when 
we have sent our best comrades to fight’.143 It is clear that Pollitt was deeply affected by his 
experience of Spain, which is perhaps what eased him towards the more overt patriotic tones and 
romanticism he later expressed - in a hope that it would not be replicated. During the Spring of 1939, 
he emphasised that any support for the Spanish people ‘is just as much a question of self-interest and 
self-defence’, as it is of ‘humanitarianism and sympathy for a heroic people’.144 Pollitt argued that an 
‘independent Britain’, would not be possible so long as the country ‘allowed Spain to be sacrificed by 
Mussolini and Hitler’, claiming it was as much an attack ‘upon your home, your freedom, and your 
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peace’ as it was theirs.145 He highlighted the ‘will’ of the Spanish people numerous times in this 
period, just as much as he drilled home the image of a truly proletarian army, in the International 
Brigade. They were idolised almost as immediately as they arrived in Albacete, with Pollitt noting on 
his first visit in February 1937, that they were ‘the flower of the British people’ who have ‘done 
things, the like of which has never been heard of before’. 146 
The International Brigade had ‘enlarged’ the Labour tradition, into something greater than its whole, 
‘into something much bigger’, filling it with a ‘greater meaning’.147 They were an inspiration, both to 
the Party and the country, ‘helping us all in our work of guarding the banner of freedom and 
liberty’.148 They would not be forgotten, as whilst they were ‘unknown, and were not big names from 
back street and factory, they will live forever.’ 149 The Party began to assign a high value to the 
achievements of ‘heroic’ volunteers in Spain, placing them as the forerunners of a wide current of 
English history, such as the Chartists. 150 These historic movements were the bedrock of what the 
International Brigade would go on to achieve, as even Dimitrov, a Bulgarian, made clear in 1935 that 
the ‘Popular Front’ would be based on the ‘glorious traditions of the Chartist movement, and the First 
International of Marx and Engels…in defence of democracy, culture and peace’.151 It provided the 
catalyst for the British Battalion to, in Rust’s words, ‘march away to shed their blood in a foreign 
land, so that we may live in peace’.152 Following in the example of these national heroes, the ‘fiery 
furnace of Spain’, had created a situation where these ‘boys’ would ‘one day become the leaders of 
our movement’, whose actions, were indicative of a new British society. 153 They were immortal, as 
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Bill Rust, the reporter for the Daily Worker in Spain placed the International Brigade forever in the 
collective memory, stating that they will ‘shine for ever in the annals of history’.154  
They are our people, flesh of our flesh, blood of our blood, bound to us by a thousand living 
ties of living and friendship, and we have the right to be proud of them and to shout their 
achievements bravely to the skies. 155 
It was during this period that the memorialization of the International Brigade reached its zenith. Tom 
Buchanan’s work on the subject has delved into the lengths the Party went to firmly entrench the 
Battalion in the national collective memory. He describes the events of remembrance as ‘increasingly 
planned and choreographed to create the maximum emotional impact’.156 Indeed, a series of National 
Memorial Meetings held between September 1938 and January the following year, highlighted the 
Party’s indebtedness to the volunteers. Attracting large audiences, ‘the meetings took on ‘a mournful, 
liturgical character, as the names of working-class heroes were slowly chanted’. 157 However, the 
remembrance of the fighters was not purely instrumental, but directly underpinned the Party’s later 
efforts at ‘mass politics’. It according to one historian, allowed the Party to promote a ‘Popular Front’ 
politics, more powerfully, precisely because Britain faced the imminent threat of war. They continue 
that ‘elegy to the heroism and sacrifice in Spain spoke to qualities soon to be called upon again’.158  
The International Brigade was placed at the centre of all propaganda, for ‘the British labour 
movements must learn to treasure the men of the International Brigade and to fire the youth of the 
country with their mighty story’.159 It was not an uncommon comparison, as Tom Wintringham made 
this same assessment in English Captain, describing the volunteers as the ‘inheritors of a long-
standing English tradition’. 160 However, many in the Party understood that the Battalion’s deeds may 
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not be as readily appreciated as soon as the Party wished, meaning it was their duty to popularize their 
efforts and ensure that the ‘real Britain’ was well-known. For example, the CC convened in October 
1937, and proposed that greater emphasis was needed on ‘popularizing England’s great traditions’ to 
establish that the British Battalion ‘stimulate us in our propaganda’ and ensure it is ‘more sentimental 
and touching’. 161 They were adamant that their good work must not be squandered, as the P.B agreed 
to ‘initiate a mass service that will ensure closer contact between ourselves and the Battalion’ to 
guarantee, despite all their populist pretences, that the Battalion was a Communist led initiative.162 As 
the name ‘Popular Front’ suggests, it was a populist line change, meaning the working-class were not 
their sole target, but the middle-classes too. Pollitt articulated this view during his speech at the 
Seventh World Congress in 1935, claiming that the United Front gives ‘opportunities for advancing 
the whole line of the Communist Party amongst people with whom we have had little personal contact 
and who are generally hostile to communism’ 163  
It was necessary to ensure it was perceived as a mass-movement, even if it was only initially unity 
among socialist groups. As Horner suggested, if the Party was to have any success ‘drawing liberal 
and middle-class sections of the population’, the left must not be in dispute, for ‘who wishes to enter a 
house divided against itself?’164 Around this time, the CPGB were focussing on a potential alliance 
with the ILP and Socialist League, in the form of the ‘Unity Campaign’. Dutt explained the Party’s 
position in his monthly periodical, Labour Monthly, describing the aim of the campaign as 
‘specifically directed to oppose and to prevent tendencies to breakaways on the left, no less than 
disruptive measures on the right.’ 165 Despite initial progress, the campaign ultimately failed, mostly 
over disagreements on the Soviet Union, Spain and the ongoing Moscow Trials. It demonstrated that 
the Party were entertaining ideas of unity, and whilst there were red lines, Pollitt’s comment that the 
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Party should ‘work on issues they are particularly interested in’ showed that the Party had ceded the 
ideological battle.166 
A New Landscape for A Revitalised Britain. 
The CPGB’s vision for a new Britain was constructed upon the back of its progressive ideals, seeking 
to build on the country’s already existing institutions, people, and landscape. The Party began to decry 
the seizure of English lands and principles by the rich, at the expense of the poor, with Pollitt instead 
commanding, ‘the long struggle of the workers and peasants, this is the real history of Britain; it needs 
no recital, it belongs to us!’167 It was a psychological issue for Pollitt, and one of taking back 
ownership. He wanted reform and ‘a grip on our land’ - for he questioned who it was who enjoyed the 
countryside ‘from which our fathers were driven’.168 How could the working class be patriotic, if they 
did not have the means to travel the full breadth of its terrain? It was a pertinent question proposed by 
Pollitt, as he questioned how many workers ‘children ever see their country; especially if they have 
just seen a few miles from their street’. 169 Pollitt’s tone undertook a rural romanticism, possibly 
because of his own Lancashire background, as he directed his fury towards those ‘who control our 
press, our milk, our tin, our steel, and every other produce we use; they keep us off our own land and 
countryside’.170 Again, in almost Tolkien-esque fashion, Pollitt declared that ‘Britain has the loveliest 
natural country in the world’, emphasizing its ‘hills and dales, and its mountains and seas’. The 
landscape was indicative of the political world surrounding at, as he continued that ‘in uniting 
common forces’, Britain could become ‘a paradise of joy on which the sun will never set’.171 He 
nodded at an idyllic Britain on numerous occasions, positing that the emergence of a Popular Front 
government ‘could transform Britain into a green and pleasant land’. 172 It was an issue of harnessing 
the progressive will of the people, as the Party called upon ‘every democrat, peace-lover and friend of 
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freedom…to change the whole situation at home and abroad from anxiety, to the hope and brightness 
of a May morning.’.173  
The prospect of a ‘People’s Government’ would remedy what had occurred in the ‘derelict areas, and 
the countryside’, whilst peace was on the horizon if the country ceded to the U.S.S.R’s desire for 
collective security, providing the opportunity to ‘build on what all of us desire above all else – homes, 
health, and happiness for the people of this country’.174 One such article in Labour Monthly, directly 
contrasted the defeat of ‘privilege and reaction’, with the ‘return of a government which will defend 
peace…and the interests of the people in town and the countryside’. 175 The emphasis became on 
returning to the peaceful times of old, removing the class context. Indeed, the Daily Worker 
questioned whether Britain’s admission into war would mean the destruction of the countryside itself.  
176 For just as ‘eternal British values’ were being betrayed, the landscape itself became a source of 
attachment in Pollitt’s sense of national identity. As Smith has proposed, ‘some notion of the eternal 
may necessarily attach to all identities…as the characteristics of a people find their metaphorical 
reference in the features of the landscape.’177 It is not unusual for identities to imagine an innate 
distinctiveness, whether that be by landscape, culture, heritage or geographical border, and the CPGB 
were nothing new. Gramsci, seemingly ahead of the curve, posed that the problem the left had 
regarding nationhood and the nation-state was in maintaining their position as ‘popular-
representatives’, and as forerunners of the ‘national-popular-collective will’.178 
The French Communist Party (PCF) made similar observations to the CPGB in this respect, stating 
that the ‘nation represents a factor in human liberation for the closer co-operation of the peoples under 
conditions of equal rights’. 179 The PCF declared itself as ‘the Party of the people, of the disinherited, 
of the oppressed; it is the Party of all progressive Frenchmen — that is, of the great mass of the 
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nation.’ 180 National communisms were rife, sweeping across the continent, as Parties were given free 
lead in contrasting their patriotism, with that of the national bourgeoisie, as in essence, the national 
question had become a class question. Perhaps, this is why the Party positioned itself as 
representatives of a populist, ultimately progressive Britain - they were the embodiment of ‘the 
national’, and given the Party’s disastrous turn during the ‘Class against Class’ period, as well as the 
emergence of Mosley’s fascists, a rightwards turn is not surprising.  
Chamberlain vs The People. 
Britain was regarded as the manifestation of monopoly capital. Fascism, according to Dimitrov at the 
Seventh World Congress, was the synthesis of the ‘most reactionary, most chauvinist and most 
imperialist elements of finance capital’. 181 It was the final hurrah for the bourgeoisie to maintain their 
class interests, meaning fascism was not modernistic, but archaic, antithetical to the national interests, 
and simply capitalism re-defined. 182 Chamberlain’s government was ‘proto-fascist’, being led by a 
‘vested gang’ of ‘elites’ who had betrayed the national interest. It was placed within a long-running 
historical battle, between the English working and ruling classes. They were the ‘descendants of the 
tyrants’, ‘the enemies of progress’, whom the British people have ‘fought bitterly for hundreds of 
years.’ 183 The English working classes, which on many occasions went far beyond class boundaries, 
were indicative of the country’s ‘finest traditions’ who fought far and wide ‘in struggles against 
oppression and tyranny’. 184 To be truly British, or more likely English, was to be pro-democracy, a 
fighter for freedom, and above-all, working class. On numerous occasions, Pollitt framed the National 
Government as ‘lowering Britain’s prestige in the eyes of the world’, contrasting their Britain with his 
own – ‘we cannot allow the Chamberlain government to be looked upon as representative of the 
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British people. For it has betrayed our past, as it will more cruelly and decisively betray us unless we 
defeat them.’185  
Pollitt, in typical bellicose fashion, speaking at an event in Manchester, told comrades to ‘never allow 
yourselves to be kidded into shooting for Chamberlain. If you shoot for this National Government, 
you are shooting for Fascism.’ 186 His ‘ruling gang’ were enemies of Britain and democracy, and the 
‘natural friends of fascism’ and reaction. 187 The Party viewed Chamberlain as seceding to fascist, 
anti-British policies at home, as Dutt proposed that ‘there must be no artificial separation between 
foreign policy and home questions’.188 ‘He wants to transplant the Hitler system to Britain, to crush 
political opposition and end democratic rights’, Dutt asserted. 189 The Party began to peddle a 
distorted version of class war, as class and nation became blurred concepts. Instead, their analysis was 
less a systematic examination of capitalism, but a deep moral assessment. Chamberlain was a 
‘monster’, ‘a foul reactionary’ who was throwing the nation into disrepair. 190 The problem became 
individualised, presenting Chamberlain not as an actor of social forces, but as the sole enemy of 
‘everything progressive and democratic in Britain’. 191 It was something the Party furthered in 1944, 
condemning the entire German people as Nazis: ‘millions of youths behave worse than beasts and the 
entire nation must take responsibility for crimes committed in its name’.192 As Field has succinctly 
summarised: 
The new vocabulary was both unifying and levelling: an exclusive and conflictual class 
discourse directed against the ‘old gang’ of ‘vested interests’…coupled with more inclusive 
                                                          
185 Report of the Fifteenth Congress.  
186 “Manchester’s Centenary: A Marxist Pageant Youth Tribute to Tom Mann”. Manchester Guardian. 20th 
June. 1938. 
187 The Communist Crusade. Harry Pollitt. Labour Monthly. February 1939, p. 68. 
188 CP/IND/DUTT/31/05. The Crusade for The Defence of the British People, 16th Jan 1939. 
189 Ibid. 
190 “We Can't Burn Our Fingers”, 17 March 1938. & R. P. Arnot. Crusade for Defence of the British People. 
Labour Monthly. January 1939. p.21. 
191 Ibid:21. 
192 William Rust, ‘Speaking for the Germans’. Daily Worker 21st July 1944, cited in Laybourn, K. (1999). Under 
the Red Flag.p.115. 
44 
 
and conciliatory populist messages about a common national heritage, shared loyalties, and 
traditions. 193 
It is what allowed the Party to make inroads into the political mainstream, standing alongside figures 
of all colours, including Winston Churchill and David Lloyd George. During one event with the latter 
in April 1939, Lloyd George addressed 10,000 members of the LBC in London at Earl’s Court, 
alongside Pollitt, Stafford Cripps and Gollancz, questioning, ‘why the government had betrayed 
Britain’s great and honoured trust so ignominiously’.194 Britain had been betrayed, whilst the 
democratic system was being usurped by outside forces, unable to fulfil its historic role, as Pollitt 
made clear: ‘in Britain it is not the democratic system that is at fault, but the trouble lies in the 
strangle-hold on democracy by big business and the ruling families’. 195 It was statements such as 
these, so dissimilar in character to those made by liberal progressives that showcased the Party’s new 
politics. This was not an issue to be taken lightly however, as the Party were aware that there were 
dangers in becoming what McIlroy has described as a ‘pressure group on the Labour Party, the unions 
and the British state’.196 Campbell confirmed this at the 1937 congress: ‘Let our comrades be under no 
illusions. They are going into one of the outstanding breeding grounds of reformism and we hope they 
will go in as communists and remain in as communists’.197 Whilst, a year later in Birmingham, Pollitt 
responded to Party critics, saying ‘No one is proposing a love match or permanent marriage with 
Liberalism or any other creed whose basic principles differ from our own.’198 Instead, it was 
communism adapted to the current political conditions. However, despite Pollitt’s comments, there 
was no doubt, in the short-term at least, that the Party was invested in liberal democracy, as reformist 
tendencies ran rampant throughout the Party, the further the Party entrenched itself within the 
‘Popular Front’ line. 
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‘Democratise the Machine’ 
Its various calls for democratisation of the British army was one startling instance of the CPGB’s 
shift, highlighting the Party’s move towards conciliation with prevalent power structures, such as the 
armed forces, and Empire, rather than actively fighting against it. Previously, there is no doubt the 
army was viewed as a constituent part of both the British Empire and imperialism, meaning critiques 
of its hierarchical make-up were common. The Party’s stance on war, conscription, ‘National Service’ 
and the military changed fundamentally in a very short period. In 1936, the Party told the YCL that 
there must be an increase in ‘militant, intense anti-military propaganda, which must sweep throughout 
the youth movement’.199 The Party was thoroughly committed, much like the rest of the Labour 
movement to an anti-war stance. Dictated by the Soviet Union’s collective security pacts, the Party 
reiterated that defence of the Soviet Union was crucial, as the Party claimed that they were means of 
‘determining who is a supporter and who an opponent of democracy and peace’.200 The mistakes of 
the post-war period were not to be replicated, as peace became the ultimate goal of the movement.201 
Pollitt emphasised this in a Daily Worker column in February 1936, stating that ‘Never Again’ must 
take on an organised form, ‘that will confront the National Government with such a formidable 
challenge it dare not ignore’. 202 It affected the Party’s cross-party unity attempts also, as during the 
‘Unity Campaign’, the CPGB advocated greater international unity between Great Britain, the Soviet 
Union and France - positing the potential of a British-Soviet pact, like the French equivalent signed in 
1935. 203  
The Spanish Civil War, and the heightened militarism of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy changed 
everything. The Party’s 1937 National Congress called to nationalise the arms industry, to remove 
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‘reactionary pro-fascist elements’ and abolish the hierarchical military boundaries of servitude. 204 
Meanwhile, Pollitt writing in the Daily Worker in June 1939, called for the government to ‘make the 
Army democratic…and open the way to officer’s rank to men from the common people’.205 He 
returned to this point on numerous occasions, highlighting in 1942, a class discrimination in the war 
effort. How was it in the name of national unity possible, he questioned, for officer pilots and sergeant 
pilots who risk death together, but cannot eat together!’.206 Willy Gallacher, Communist MP for West 
Fife, furthered this line, questioning during a Parliamentary debate in March 1938, how he could 
‘advise young Communists, who are very keen, active and capable young fellows, to join the Army’. 
Instead, he posited that, ‘if there were real democracy in the Army, I could provide you with any 
amount of capable potential leaders. As it is, they would not get in; they are too lively, too energetic, 
there is too much spirit in them’. 207  
Much of the Party’s ‘working-class resistance’ was formed within the ideological confines of the 
‘nation’, seeking not to overthrow it, but merely reform it - expanding the boundaries of the nation to 
become inclusive of working-class actors. Conscription was an example of this new shift. In May 
1939, Pollitt stated that ‘the army is a class army officered by men who are our class enemies, who are 
hostile to everything the Labour movement stands for’.208 Yet typically of the period, this did not 
mean that it was something that should dissuade them, so long as it came under ‘democratic control’, 
as Dutt a month later said that the Party were ‘in favour of whatever measures…which are necessary 
for the victory of democratic rights and the defeat of reaction and fascism.’ 209 The concept of a 
citizens ‘National Service’ was also mentioned the same year, which Gallacher fully supported given 
the ‘right government’ being in power.210 It was not so much a quantitative problem, but a qualitative 
one – for so long as a Labour-led, Popular Front government was in power, support for the nation in 
its military endeavours was to be supported.  
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‘The question of defence is not only a question of guns. It is also a question of who controls 
them’, Pollitt explained at the Party’s 1937 Congress.211 
 They were essentially following Dimitrov’s commandment from 1935 that Communist Parties should 
‘defend every inch of the democratic gains which the working class has wrested in years of 
struggle’.212 Fighting for the country’s current institutions presided over all else, as the Party became 
one of democracy’s loudest defenders. Democracy was for the people of Britain, something that goes 
back to their very ‘origins and root’ – a struggle between the common people and their rulers for 
freedom. 213 ‘Democracy in Britain has always been a bread-and-butter question’, declared Pollitt, its 
‘great traditions of freedom won from the teeth of Britain’s rulers’. 214 It was the overriding objective, 
as Dutt professed in April 1938, that the immediate issue is not socialism, but to defeat the National 
Government.215 A letter to the CP membership in April 1939, spelled out the CP’s position, as it 
called for diligence in the quest for socialism, noting ‘it is absolutely necessary for the working-class 
to close its ranks and fight with determination against every attempt to restrict the rights it has won – 
and fight fascism’.216 It was a case of battening down the hatches and fighting for what was already 
won, rather than pursuing a revolutionary advance. The Party claimed that ‘fascism can only be 
fought by democracy. It is the most urgent task of the whole Labour movement and all British 
democrats.’217  
Fascism was not a juncture in the evolution of capitalism, but a small elite faction of corrupt 
politicians who had abandoned the national interest. It was as simple as harnessing the levers of power 
already in place and allowing the popular political instinct to come to the fore, as Gallacher was in no 
doubt that ‘the people of this country will be aroused to a feeling of wrath against the betrayals that 
have taken place and will drive this Government out of office.’ 218 Britishness was under attack, and it 
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was the CPGB’s job to ensure it remained untarnished. One such example was articulated by 
Gallacher in the House of Commons. He inquired ‘why there is such fierce indignation against Soviet 
propaganda directed against capitalism, and such a placid attitude with regard to anti-British 
propaganda?’219 It was clear for Gallacher, Pollitt and much of the CPGB that Britain had gone weak 
in the face of continental fascism and was acceding to its every demand. The country needed to be 
stronger, and the CPGB filled the vacuum.  
A Working-Class British History. 
One such example of the new and improved Britain was the Party’s view on the monarchy. In 1937, 
the Party described the monarchy as a bulwark against social progress and democracy, whose 
existence implicitly saw the build-up of the army. 220 The Party emphasised its ulterior political 
element, declaring it a ‘state circus…in order to beat the war drum and to work up an unbalanced 
jingoistic fervour’.221 They viewed jingoism as easily substituted for ‘fascist-leader worship’, which 
was why it was crucial to place opposition to the monarchy, within the struggle for democracy 
itself.222 So, whilst Taylor is correct to state that the Party equated patriotism centred around the 
monarchy with jingoism, the evidence suggests that hostility to jingoism, was not hostility to 
patriotism in of itself. 223 For the CPGB, the Monarchy represented ‘all that is bad in the past history 
and traditions of the British people’. 224 Asserting its position at the National Congress in Battersea in 
1937, the Party declared - ‘there is no room for the monarchy in the twentieth century. We are against 
the monarchy, because we are against privilege and reaction, because we stand for democracy’. 225 
Although the Party had always been critical of the Monarchy, the nature of its argument was what had 
changed. The Party was for the abolition of the Monarchy because it was antithetical to democracy 
and a betrayal of the ‘True Britain’. Instead, the Party declared that the working classes had their own 
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history, ‘we have our Tolpuddle martyrs, our Chartists, our John MacLeans, our Meerut prisoners, and 
our Taff Merthyr fighters.’226 It was a working-class history, but one which they hoped could resonate 
with all. The aim was to make it national in both name and substance. One such example was in a 
passage in the Daily Worker in May 1936: 
WE Communists are the true patriots. We love our language and our country. And that is why 
we, more than anybody, are grieved to see to what disgrace our rulers, the capitalist class, 
have brought it.227 
For just as pre-war socialism had sought to legitimate their socialism as falling within a British 
tradition, the CPGB followed stead. 228 The CPGB drew upon issues which the left highlighted 
decades earlier, as the left has long contested their own brand of patriotism. Their version of 
‘Britishness’ demonstrating the ease in which ‘British’, as a political identification, is under constant 
refinement. Robert Blatchford, one of the key exponents of early socialist Englishness, noted that ‘at 
present Britain does not belong to the British: it belongs to a few of the British…it is because Britain 
does not belong to the British that a few are very rich and the many are very poor’. 229 This view had 
staying power, as after all, the best-selling socialist book of the late nineteenth century was 
Blatchford’s own Merrie England. 230  
Undeniably, the Communists were not the only force on the left hoping to meld socialism with 
patriotism. Walter Citrine and the TUC in 1934, on the one hundredth anniversary of the ‘Tolpuddle 
Matryrs’, essentially dug the six Dorset labourers from the archives of history, presenting it as a 
forbearer to the current socialist movement, highlighting working-class ‘heroes’ who were, in their 
view, ancestors to a long-running socialist tradition. 231 As Clare Griffins has discovered, ‘much of 
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their enduring fame rests on the fact that in 1934, the TUC honoured these pioneers with a tribute on a 
scale bestowed on no other trade-union heroes before or since.’232 Even the CP were aware of this 
martyrisation, as Allen Hutt in 1934, penned a sarcastic retort to the TUC’s event, querying that, ‘the 
working class is always ready to honour its heroes and martyrs…but let us ask ourselves just why the 
Trades Union Congress is making these exceptional efforts to put over the Tolpuddle centenary in 
such a big way.’233 The CP’s reversal on the issue, in a matter of years, showcased the Party’s lack of 
distinctiveness, and echoing of the larger labour movement.  
However, this is not a stick to beat the Party with, as they were merely following a long-running 
precedent of remembering key figures within the working-class movement, albeit, in an entirely 
different manner. The ‘March for English History’ on September 20th, 1936, much derided by 
historians, is the most obvious example of this linkage between the historical past and the present. 
England! A word of power. A name deeply engraved on the minds of men…THE PEOPLE 
OF ENGLAND! A great nation…a people with a great history, great achievements, great 
traditions. And with even greater aspirations, not yet fulfilled, but which shall be.  234 
The Party’s usage of history was complex – for it sought to both emphasize its past triumphs, as well 
as look forward towards the future - seeking to offer something new and distinct, as well as build on 
the country’s already existing history and institutions. They were reflective of a unique national 
culture, but also its logical forerunners. It was as London District Organiser, Ted Bramley reported in 
the march’s aftermath:  
The Communist Party is learning to speak to the English workers in a language they 
understand. It is beginning to grasp the great and glorious tradition of the English people…It 
[communism] is revealing itself as the legitimate heir of generations of great English fighters 
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for freedom and progress. It is preparing and will lead the people to a free and Merrie 
England.235 
As Benedict Anderson has underlined, national identity enables us to transcend our innate mortality 
by linking us to something whose existence is beyond what is conceivable, as well as forwards into 
the indefinite future.236 As such, Communists were not just carrying the torch for a socialist future; 
they were also the descendants of a historic legacy of radicalism, distinctly of the English kind – 
offering a highly localised sense of past, present and future. The CP were a natural result of England’s 
‘great traditions’, from England itself, from ‘England’s soil’.237 It was a message that permeated 
throughout the Party, and one which benefited from their embrace of new forms of propaganda. 
Culture was no longer bourgeois and antithetical to the working-classes real, every-day lives, but 
something pervasive, which the working-classes both enjoyed and could potentially re-align alongside 
progressive values. It was not far-removed from the lives of workers, as culture, Edgell Rickword 
explained, is ‘not only music, science and philosophy, it is games, dancing and popular songs.’238  
The ‘Popular Front’ in Action 
Songs, pageants, dramas and the like became the means for creating the ‘new Britain’. The Daily 
Worker’s call to action in January 1938 for ‘every form of propaganda and agitation to be fully 
utilised’, did not go unheard. 239 In a circular to Party members in January 1938, it noted that ‘for the 
first time, a special crusade song was written’. It was clear that the ‘Popular Front’ opened the 
floodgates to modes of activity that had previously been either ignored or were downright impossible. 
As whilst, the document admitted that ‘the majority of branches had failed to understand how 
valuable it is in getting the Party line over to the audience’. 240 The Party continued unabated, quoting 
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both old material and new. One such example, was Ernest Jones at the Party’s Congress in 1938 - in 
keeping with the parallels between the CP and the Chartist movement. 
They think us dull, they think us dead, 
But we shall rise again. 
A trumpet through the land shall ring, 
A heaving through the mass. 
A trampling through their palaces,  
Until they break like glass.241 
Song became a means of communicating the Party line, in a tongue which the common worker 
understood. Numerous attempts were made to connect the struggle against the National Government, 
alongside the creation of a ‘People’s Government’. One such ballad, found in the Daily Worker, 
presented the nation as in disrepair, as an ‘old beast dying’, requiring collective action to remove 
Chamberlain and return to ‘Old England’s glory’. 
 Says I: "You've seen Old England's glory”,  
Says he: "That's just a bed-time story”, 
Says I: "What price the British lion”?  
Says he: "The poor old beast is dying',  
Now landsmen who're loyal to Britain,  
it’s time that Chamberlain was quttin'. 
So, drop your tiffs and heave together,  
We'll end this dirty work for ever. 242 
                                                          
241 For Peace and Plenty: Report of the Fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party of Great Britain. 
242 Daily Worker, July 20, 1939. 
53 
 
Only a year previously, songs were viewed as a dead vehicle for popular culture, unhelpful in the 
wider struggle. In-fact, A.L. Lloyd went so far as to write in the Daily Worker that ‘capitalism has put 
an end to folk-art, for the time being’.243 For Lloyd, ‘present-day culture’ was a means of undermining 
the ‘self-confidence of the working-class’.244 Folk-art was being strangled by the miseries of capitalist 
industrialism’, as modernity had  ‘artificially’ presented workers as ‘inartistic’. This was all a façade 
for Lloyd however, as folk song, or the ‘People’s Poetry’, showcased ’what wonderful poetry the 
workers were capable of!’, which would only prosper when the English people are ‘free’245 The 
popular element of the ‘Popular Front’ lent itself enormously to this creed, depicting a common 
comradery, a shared belief in something new, and crucially were readily replicated. Two such 
examples shown below, showcased the Party’s usage of folksong in the era, alluding to a strident 
defence of democracy and the prospect of a People’s Government. 
Forging Ahead: 
From the workshop, the mine and the factory, 
From the city and village, we throng, 
At the call, workers all, 
Swell the strain of democracy’s song. 
Chorus: 
We belong to the People’s Crusade, 
To the anti-fascist brigade, 
We stand for security, peace and bread, 
With ranks united, we’ll forge ahead 
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We can drive the wolf from the door: 
Save the world from the menace of war, 
And the National Government will be broken, not just bent: 
If we struggle as never before. 
Verse: 
For the workless and starving we struggle, 
To the homeless we reach out a hand, 
Comrades all, here the call, 
Marching on to a happier land.246 
For Peace and Right: 
Verse: 
In China, Spain and Austria,  
By tyrants’ power betrayed, 
The people call democracy,  
To rally to their aid: 
Chorus: 
To friends of peace throughout the world, 
We give our pledge this day, 
That Britain in the cause of peace, 
Her rightful part shall play: 
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United for security, against aggressions might 
Democracy shall, in this hour,  
Stand fast for peace and right –  
Democracy shall, in this hour, 
Stand fast for peace and right. 
Verse: 
Through war’s dark cloud hangs over us, 
Through doubts and fears asail:  
The will to peace in every land. 
United shall prevail. 247 
Pageantry – A Mass Movement? 
Songs were not the only form of Party propaganda unleashed during the Popular Front. The historical 
Pageant utilised extensively post-1935, ‘has become an important feature in the Party’s propaganda’ 
claimed the Party’s 1938 manifesto. 248 They were a key feature in Party publications, as often they 
were the most vivid expressions of Party ideals. One significant example in Sunderland utilised 
former International Brigaders as the model ‘British’ radical. 249 Whilst, in the summer of 1939, a 
‘Chartist Pageant’, held at the Empress Stadium; produced in conjunction with the London Arts 
Committee, involved over 1000 actors, and attracted over 10,000 attendees. 250 The Party’s aims were 
two-fold, seeking to accentuate working-class history first and foremost, before eventually, making 
what it saw as pertinent links to the current political situation. The successes and failures of the 
Chartists were not just crucial in the 1800s, but to the present day. Pageants were a successful avenue 
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of Party propaganda precisely because it placed them both within and outside of popular memory, 
seeking both to protect it, and take it forward into the future. The Party legitimated their actions by 
solidifying themselves within a long-running tradition, however, this is nothing unusual. As Eric 
Hobsbawm’s seminal book, the Invention of Tradition argued, what have often been ‘selected, 
written, popularized and institutionalized’ are often ‘deliberate and always innovative, if only because 
their historical novelty implies innovation’.251  
Pageants allowed the CPGB to cherry-pick selected episodes of history and neatly tie them within 
their own historical narrative. It was such a device that allowed the Party to create an image of the 
‘Hands off Russia’ movement as one of the same with ‘the heroic story of Chartism’ - tying solidarity 
to the Soviet Union alongside radical British history. 252 Following the performance, it ended with a 
keynote speech from Harry Pollitt, who declared that the fight was ever-present; ‘we are proud to 
know that these ideals, which began to be realised 100 years ago, will be full realised here 
tomorrow.’253  The People’s Charter, which Party historian Allen Hutt described as ‘the six points that 
roused a nation’, were the democratic prelude to social revolution.254 The Party were the defenders of 
what the Chartists had fought for in their ‘epic struggle’, announcing in the Daily Worker, a day of 
remembrance for the Chartist movement in February 1939.255 Their struggles were a direct prequel to 
the struggles of today, for they were who had ‘blazed the trail, which it is the pride and privilege of 
their descendants to carry forward to victory’. 256 It was irrelevant that the Chartist movement had 
ultimately failed, as the historical insights they offered were only now being understood; they were 
‘the first internationalists’, as Salme Dutt asserted, ‘the great richness of the Chartist struggle…is only 
now being restored’.257  
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Manchester, the site of much industrial struggle, was the focus of many pageants. Highlighting 
episodes from ‘the early times of the English people for industrial and political liberty’, pageants 
emphasised that the sacrifices of prior generations were for nil if the working-classes did not take up 
the mantle.258 In a tribute to Tom Mann, one speaker quoted Shelley, calling on the people to ‘rise like 
brave lions’. 259 It was history rich in working-class activism, from Peterloo to the Chartists, as Pollitt 
declared that ‘Manchester belongs to its people’. 260 Peterloo became, one of the Party’s main 
examples of political martyrdom; a struggle between capital and labour, and a theme touched upon for 
many decades. 261 
The Communist Crusade for Defence of the People was one of the Party’s most overt attempts at 
appealing to a submerged nationhood. It sought to ‘defend the lives and livelihood of the British 
people’, emphatically declaring that ‘the British people have a glorious record in the struggle for 
freedom.’ 262 The campaign demonstrated, the Party’s implantation in wider society, resulting in by 
March 1938, 180 meetings and 62,000 attendants across the country. 263 It was the ‘greatest campaign 
ever organised by the Party’ according to one summary document sent to Party districts.264 And yet, it 
was conducted in a manner that was completely alien to the Party, only a few years previously. 
Pageants were crucial means of popularizing a ‘popular history’, instrumentalizing a particular 
version of history to ensure that its attendees truly felt a sense of ‘time and place’. Historical pageants, 
according to Heinemann were ‘impressive because they not only spoke to great audiences, but 
actively involved literally thousands.’ 265 Pageants greatly aided attempts to construct a competing 
Englishness, as the Party gradually moved away from large marches and towards mass-gatherings and 
rallies. Its participatory element was essential, as Wallis has described, ‘turning the audience into 
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historical agents’.266 It legitimised a particular version of history, and the Party’s role as its current 
manifestation – for if the Party led a march for English history, it could claim to be its current 
forerunners, as well as the gatekeepers of its historic legacy. Undoubtedly, the ‘Englishing of 
Communism’ achieved moments of ‘organic celebration, however, overwhelmingly, that organicity 
was itself manufactured.267 Raphael Samuel, has delved deeper into this issue: 
A great deal of Party activity—like that of any organization—was less instrumental than 
expressive, a way of building up symbolic capital rather than (or as well as) attaining practical 
ends. In many cases it served a consolatory function. The rallies and meetings displayed what 
was often an imaginary strength; the big turnouts…compensated for the absence of a real 
popular following.268 
The Party achieved this because of its calls to ‘all sane people’, ‘progressives’, and ‘men and women 
of all creeds’, rather than the industrial working-class.269 It was populist to its very core, as the class 
contingent was empty. Nationalism became the framework to conceal class relations, in favour of a 
national unity, which supposedly quashed ‘national differences’. The problem for the CPGB lay when 
they tied their socialist ideals to a nationalist framework that was conducted in the same language, 
terms and ideological boundaries as those they sought to unseat. In a period of hostile fascism at home 
and abroad, alongside a fragmented left, the Party’s purpose was no longer clear. This lack of clarity 
was also shown in the Party’s paper, The Daily Worker. It was clear that the Party vision was 
contradictory, and in a state of flux, unsure whom, or what it was supposed to represent. This was 
demonstrated by the paper’s decision to remove the hammer and sickle, as well as the classic Marx 
dictum, ‘workers of the world unite’ from its head mast in 1938. Given the Paper’s role was as Dutt 
summarised, to be a ‘communist paper, in every single column, item and headline’, and above-all, to 
‘express the Party’, this change is damning. 270  
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Many key Party figures were aware that its facade of a ‘huge, popular Party’ was not as successful as 
it let-on, as Rust complained to the Party’s National Congress in 1937 that ‘the new member does not 
get the feeling that this is a big popular Party connected with the workers. He gets the impression that 
it is some conspiratorial, hole-in-the-corner affair’.271 It was a view that permeated throughout the 
Party, as Hymie Lee, district leader in the North East questioned why, ‘in all mass activity we are 
hiding the face of the Party. Communists are working everywhere, but they don’t show they are 
communists…there is no feeling the Party is growing.’272 It is evident that despite the Party’s 
pretences, it was not readily accepted in populist initiatives either, whether that be at a local or 
national level – and very few of its members believed it. The Party’s emphasis was geared towards its 
critics; the progressive left, liberals - those outside the Party, rather than those already in it. 
Communism – An English Creed? 
During the ‘Popular Front’, the Party began to put much more emphasis on the individual. During the 
spring of 1939, The Daily Worker held an ‘Our Ancestors’ competition, offering a prize of 10s. to the 
‘best description of Chartist activity collected from family records’.273 The emphasis was on the micro 
level, as the Paper accentuated the small, individualised, family cases within the broader ‘national’ 
struggle – as the nation was to be a sum of its collective, ultimately radical parts. Parallels were drawn 
with the Russian Revolution, as Ness Edwards, member of the Executive Committee of the Miners’ 
Federation of Great Britain, declared Chartism a ‘blind, unsuccessful attempt to perform in Britain, 
what at a similar juncture of political development, was successfully performed in Russia’, as in 
essence, ‘Chartism was a premature dress rehearsal of the social revolution’.274 ‘The People’s Charter’ 
was regarded as a pre-requisite to revolution, and one firmly in the Russian model, as native English 
history and Russian history were not only one of the same, but needed to be intertwined. Debate raged 
in the CC, as the Party acknowledged more emphasis needed to be placed on the successes of the 
Soviet Union. After all, the Party was a constituent part of an international movement, and its duty 
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was to effectively defend the legacy of the Soviet Union, as much as it was to entice the working-class 
in Britain to communist ideals. In fact, the Party’s role in articulating Soviet successes, was not solely 
a gesture, but appealed to a wide range of opinion. As John Saville has described, ‘the literature 
favourable to the Soviet Union was quite remarkable in its volume, and much of it emanated from 
non-Communist sources’.275 The successes of the Soviet Union would speak for themselves, and in a 
climate of Russophillia for many on the left (notably on economic planning and increasing living 
standards), Pollitt proclaimed that the Soviet Union, ‘is today the strongest weapon in our hands.’276 It 
was a widespread phenomenon, as in the words of one historian, ‘the efficacy of Soviet central 
planning captivated the world after 1929’.277 For even potential critics and non-socialists found the 
Soviet system something new; as a utopia. 278 And yet, despite this wider climate sympathetic to the 
USSR, the Party had doubts about its success in ‘popularizing’ its history ‘and its achievements’. 279 It 
was an ever-running problem in the Party’s CC, as J.R. Campbell - amid the Moscow Trials debacle - 
emphasised there had not been enough work done in the ‘popularization’ of the U.S.S.R. 280  
The Bolshevik model was to be drawn upon just as vigorously as indigenous working-class English 
history – and it was attempts to make these histories intertwined, that encapsulated the CPGB in the 
late 1930s. That said, the wider left did not agree with this assessment, as the Russian Revolution was 
regarded ‘not as a model to be emulated, but an embarrassment from which they wanted to distance 
themselves’.281 And yet, nonetheless, many within the Party were perplexed by the wider Labour 
movement’s attacks, situating loyalty to the U.S.S.R as loyalty to the nation itself. Allen Hutt, in one 
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column, wrote: ‘as a patriotic Englishman I am incensed to find…those who carry on unhelpful 
propaganda…of our first great ally, the Soviet Union, and in effect, disrupt the nation’s solid front’.282 
The Party continued in this vein, as they proclaimed that ‘Marxism is rooted in British soil’, just as 
‘class struggle and class-consciousness are a native British product’. 283 ‘Revolution is native to its 
soil’, R.P. Arnot declared. 284 Englishness and Communism were one of the same, as one event 
claimed that ‘Communism grows from England’s soil…it is natural to England as the green grass and 
hedges.’ 285 In an obituary to Tom Mann, Allen Hutt presented Mann as both a ‘lifelong revolutionary 
and an Englishman…these are his two fundamental attributes, inextricably intertwined’. 286 He was a 
product of both the working class - which was by its nature, international – as well as fundamentally 
English. In typically fiery passion, Hutt questioned ‘anyone who sought to abstract Tom the 
revolutionary from his national background’ as not understanding the ‘real man’. 287  
Marxism became pliable, able to offer guidance to demonstrate that current methods were in keeping 
with typical Communist practice, tying nationalism to their internationalism to the U.S.S.R. For the 
CPGB, the Chartists demonstrated that there was something innately British about rebellion and class-
consciousness, and it was their duty to follow suit. For the Party, it became as simple as awakening a 
sleeping beast, as English radicalism had taken the appearance of the appendix, intrinsic to a forgotten 
past. A.L. Morton, a historian, wrote in the Paper that ‘the movement of today, and above all the 
Communist Party, is their lawful heir. If we can add to their fighting spirit a fuller political 
understanding, no power on earth can defeat us’. 288 It was spoken in maximalist terms, as the 
international political situation brought about an urgency to firstly, re-take national symbols and 
figures, before eventually laying claim to the nation itself. In-fact, his book, A People’s History of 
England, alongside a series of others such as, Christopher Hill’s The English Revolution 1640 and 
Hymie Fagan’s Nine Days That Shook England, ‘showed English history as a complex process of 
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struggle - often tragic, and yet potentially hopeful’.289 It was both sentimental and dialectical, 
accentuating traumatic episodes from history - which often ended in failure - alongside a resurgent 
political working-class who would continue in these movements’ steps and ensure that their ‘dream 
would become reality’. 290  
Creating the Model Communist: Writers and Education. 
The Party’s new populist position came to be reflected in its education policy. Again, the CP’s 
attempts centred on homogenising a national Party around a progressive identity. The Educational 
Workers International (EWI) published a pamphlet entitled Schools at the Cross Roads, which stated 
that ‘English education is at the crossroads…we are free to choose which way we shall lead it; the 
way of fascism, the way of reaction, or the way of progress and a new society?’291 Differentiating 
between ‘Education under Fascism’, ‘Education under the Soviet Union’ and ‘English Schools in the 
Crisis’, it emphasised that education was of paramount importance.292 Schooling became a popular 
battleground in the wake of fascism’s emphasis on militarism, ethno-nationalism, and its penchant for 
the ‘perversion of culture’. However, interestingly, the CPGB wanted to ensure that the object of 
teaching remained ‘enlightenment’ and the application of reason and criticism, rather than an 
authentic ‘Socialist education’.293 The document was symptomatic of the Party’s new approach, being 
a defence of existing institutions and the liberal vision, rather than a promotion of a socialist 
alternative. This was evident in their referencing of a Japanese fascist journal, that professed to ‘rid 
the school spirit of free inquiry’.294 In the words of one recent study, the Party began to ‘maximise 
international teacher unity against fascism by focussing upon the political freedoms the profession 
enjoyed under liberal democracy.’295 Fascism was pervasive, and its effect upon the youth was 
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unprecedented, confronting them with, in Pollitt’s view, ‘the menace of a new war, which will wipe 
out the flower of the youth of the country.’296 This existential threat required that the new policy of the 
CPGB would be ‘to teach the British youth love of country’, as a means of neglecting fascism’s 
allures. 297  
The Party’s own educational life was also an area in which the ‘Popular Front’ had a significant 
effect. It was only a year prior to the Seventh World Congress that Bradley complained that there was 
a serious lack of books and pamphlets produced by the Party.298 And yet, the Party’s affiliated 
organisation, the Left Book Club, became a crucial means of distributing propaganda in a swell of 
activity. The avenue, led by Victor Gollancz, John Strachey and Stafford Cripps, enticed many writers 
across the left, and has been described as the ‘Popular Front’s greatest success according to one 
historian. 299 Contemporary observers were also positive, as George Orwell remarked that the ‘Popular 
Front’ was the ‘heyday of the Left Book Club’. 300 The venture was unapologetic in its objectives, 
declaring that it would ‘devote all efforts to the explanation and advocacy of a Popular Front’, which 
in Ben Pimlott’s view, ‘created a firm association in the minds of most people between Communism 
and the Popular Front’.301 The Daily Worker followed the LBC’s lead, promoting the activities of the 
‘Communist Progressive Rambling Club’, where Communist poets such as C. Day Lewis concluded 
that ‘socialism alone’, could rescue England. It was not untypical to see writers such as May conclude 
that ‘we Marxists declare that the English tradition has passed into our hands’.302 Meanwhile, Hymie 
Fagan’s Nine Days That Shook England, situated the Peasant Revolt, as a long-running prequel to the 
Russian Revolution, placing indigenous English history firmly alongside the Soviet Union. As Ben 
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Harker has underlined, the parallels to John Reed’s account of the October Revolution are 
unmistakeable. 303 ‘Never was a book so timely as this’, Pollitt excitedly pronounced in August 1938.  
Shining like a jewel through it all is the heroism and incorruptibility of the common people, 
our people, your people, which has revealed itself again and again, especially in the last few 
years…We have a right to be proud of our British heritage…we have the duty to learn from 
our own history – a glorious history of struggle and sacrifice.304 
Labour Monthly, followed much of the same line, commenting that ‘Fagan has succeeded better than 
any of his predecessors who have attempted to write history for the people…he has a living sense of 
the revolutionary traditions of the English people’. 305 It was clear that contemporary literary culture 
and historical writing could be fine-tuned to current conditions, highlighting past failures and 
successes, in keeping with the country’s real ‘revolutionary past’. It continued: 
 Let that lesson of the revolutionary past of the English people come home to-day. Once again 
wide sections of the people are being drawn into action against a ruling oligarchy; they are 
waiting for a lead that can come only from the working class, because there is to-day, as there 
was not in 1381, a dominant class that can take the leadership in the struggle. Let the leaders 
of the labour movement have faith in the labouring class that the dream of John Ball may 
become at last reality.306 
The Young Communist League’s (YCL) newspaper Challenge, followed the same line, declaring that 
following a London meeting in March 1937, that the Party’s recruits were to follow in the steps ‘of 
the traditions of Wat Tyler and John Ball’.307 Jack Lindsay’s Who are the English? was much of the 
same, re-locating Englishness with the dissidence of class struggle, for the Popular Front’s cultural 
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output represented ‘life rather than death, the future for the nation, rather than its destruction.’ 308 It 
was a moment of tension, between the forces of reaction and progress, as the CPGB positioned itself 
at the helm in the battle for the nation’s future.  
Culture was at the wheel of this national rejuvenation, as the ‘Popular Front’ permitted a ‘flowering’ 
of national communism, allowing writers to write on behalf of the Party, as Communists. However, 
throughout the Party’s life, culture in the Party was constantly under tension, unsure whether it was 
something to be ‘endured or enjoyed, an unpredictable source of pleasure or a political weapon’. As 
Andy Croft has posited, ‘much of the Party’s history was a creative tension – to be at the same time 
both a part of British society and apart from it’.309 He continues, when the Party took writers 
‘seriously’, it was able to play a part in contemporary cultural life, but, when it dismissed mainstream 
culture as bourgeois, ‘it remained isolated, talking only to itself’. 310 The ‘Popular Front’ therefore 
allowed a significant opening in cultural life. The bureaucracy of the ‘Third Period’ eased, whilst the 
Comintern became no longer interested in the ‘day to day activities’ of the Party, allowing a more 
vibrant Party culture to take root.311 Party literature no longer decried popular culture as bourgeois and 
removed from the average worker, but authentically or not, viewed its own output as the realm of real 
national culture. As Linehan has expanded, the effort to shape and provide a culture for proletarians 
encouraged ‘expression’ within their own language and cultural codes, according workers a ‘voice 
which gave dignity to their modes of expression and life experiences.312 
Conclusion: 
During the ‘Popular Front’ period, The Communist Party of Great Britain became dictated by the 
demands of the nation – and the fight for its traditions, its history, and ultimately, its preservation. The 
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CPGB fashioned an avenue where an image of Britain, not without its historical preludes, triumphed. 
Patriotism for the Party was essentially a working-class phenomenon. It was tied to the land, to the 
workers, to the ideals of progress and rebellion, and above-all community. The Party were 
undoubtedly still internationalists in theory, however gaining national representation meant 
internationalist considerations were secondary. The balance in rhetoric shifted enormously from a 
revolutionary, internationalist, class-based analysis, to a nationalistic, pragmatic, and evolutionary 
one. However, it is crucial to emphasize that the Party must not be judged as a revolutionary party, but 
as a social-democratic one, for in 1935, following the Seventh World Congress, it ceased to be a 
revolutionary party. Instead, the international demands of the Comintern, along with the defence of 
the Soviet Union, necessitated a substantial re-think in International Communist policy, which the 
Party were willing to follow. 
As the following chapter shall show, both the Party and the Comintern’s framing of Empire and 
Imperialism differed immensely to conventional Leninist tradition. The Party were undoubtedly 
affected by anxieties in any potential blurring and obfuscation of any anti-fascist/anti-imperialist 
struggle. Placing this in mind, the Party’s national emphasis was dictated by the broader concerns of 
anti-fascism, contesting imperialisms and nascent war – as the macro and micro became one. 
Therefore, to conclude, the Party in the ‘Popular Front’ years became an unofficial mouthpiece of a 
‘Workers Britain’, which was endemic of many other Communist Parties world-wide, for their growth 
in influence and members was primarily down to their shift towards a ‘Popular Front’ politics; 
conciliation with the broader Labour movement, and benefiting from the real fear of fascism, both at 
home and abroad. 
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Chapter II: Empire, Eurocentrism and Internationalism – The CPGB 
and India, 1935-1945 
 
A central theme of the previous chapter was that the Party became fixated by a ‘nationalised’ 
communism, which as a result, also saw its international priorities evolve. A sense of collective 
identity based upon English working-class history, saw increasingly a lack of room for other 
international struggles and movements, unless of course, they originated in the Soviet Union. As 
whilst, the Party did still campaign for many international campaigns during the Popular Front - the 
international question became consumed by the national. India, as will be discussed at length in this 
chapter, was the chief casualty of this shift. For whilst it would be unfair to state that the Party 
‘abandoned’ India or its anti-imperialism, it certainly did not fit snugly within the Party’s new image, 
becoming, a square peg in a round shaped hole. The Party’s unquestioning support for the war-effort 
meant the Party took on a wholly atomised approach to imperialism, contrasting the British ‘form’ 
with its fascist counterparts, as well as arguing that revolutionary colonial advance was a distraction; a 
false dawn, that only emboldened the Fascist movement. The fixation for the period became alliances 
with other socialist groups and the progressive bourgeoisie, as the previous insistence of the 
Comintern to develop an autonomous ‘communist bloc’ was now downplayed. Undoubtedly, the 
failure of the ‘Third Period’ (namely, the Class against Class policy) had a profound effect upon the 
position of many Communist Parties within their national movements. This seismic change, on an 
international level, was due to the Soviet Union’s policy of collective security, and later conciliation 
with the main political powers, namely the United States, Great Britain and France. That said, the 
change in emphasis also nodded towards a nascent tendency towards Eurocentrism both in the 
Comintern, and in constituent parties, which became increasingly obvious following the Seventh 
World Congress in 1935.  
The CPGB’s position on India fell into three distinct phases between 1935 and the end of the Second 
World War. From the Seventh World Congress to the German invasion of Poland, the Party 
prioritised a platform of reform, national alliance with the INC, and the extension of democratic 
rights. It had its permutations, as will be discussed, but more-or-less, the Party’s critique of 
69 
 
imperialism and the British Imperial State was, is what I have termed, a soft critique. In-fact, even 
considering the ‘imperialist war’ narrative between September 1939 and June 1941, the Party’s 
activism did not reflect their language. Dubbed the ‘phony war’ period by historians, the Party called 
on all ‘Communist Parties in the belligerent countries… to unmask the war’s imperialist character’. 313 
Emanating from the highest levels of the Comintern, the Central Committee met on the 2nd October 
1939, during which Rajani Palme Dutt declared the new line:    
If you start fighting the enemy imperialists during a war, in practice, you are supporting your 
own imperialists. That does not mean we are in favour of Hitler winning anything 
whatsoever. But if for that reason we start supporting the imperialist war of Chamberlain, 
then in practice, we are supporting imperialism.314 
The Party changed line again, however, following the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, as the Party 
became the most sterling defenders of Empire and nation – calling for a ‘war on two fronts’. It was 
here that anti-fascism took precedence over anti-imperialism, and that colonial liberation was 
irrespective of broader concerns. It continued, to a greater degree, the pre-war line of the ‘Popular 
Front’, as Communist policy became nationalized, deferring socialism until the win of democracy. It 
was within this current of Russophillic feeling, that the Party had its most successful period in its 
history -quadrupling its membership -as it disavowed industrial action, enthusiastically supported the 
war effort and became the forerunners for the new allied obsession with the Soviet Union.  
It cannot be understated that there were significant differences in the implementation of the ‘Popular 
Front’ line across the globe. In Britain, the ‘Popular Front’ became a means to exert considerable 
pressure on the Labour Party. However, in the case of India, the Indian Communist Party were told to 
work within the National Congress, and other reformist organisations, but ultimately remain 
independent. The CPI had a somewhat interesting relationship with the INC, as they veered between 
outright ‘battle with Congress’ (as the primary agent of bourgeois nationalism in India) and open 
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embrace with Congress, in the battle against British imperialism. 315 Their policy was overwhelmingly 
dictated by the ideological ‘goal’ of the movement itself. For instance, if the Comintern had viewed 
the downfall of capitalism as ‘imminent’, as it did in the aftermath of the Wall Street Crash in 1929, 
the Party worked tirelessly for the dismantling of British imperialism, and its active proxies, the 
‘bourgeois nationalists’.  
On the eve of Fascist aggression, the Party undertook a more conciliatory tone – viewing its 
membership of the INC with great warmth, making grand statements that it was their ‘birth right to 
remain inside our great patriotic organisation’. 316 That said, these various ‘turns’ were decisively 
different to the Leninist tradition of acting within these unions, so long as Communists were at the 
spearhead of these organisations, as Lenin enthused the communist movement in Britain to engage 
with the Labour Party ‘as the rope supports a hanged man’.317 Even in 1935, the job was to infiltrate 
these movements, and work within the system, before ultimately becoming its revolutionary 
vanguard. Wang Ming, delegate at the Seventh World Congress for Indo-China, summed up the 
Indian position: 
Without the active participation of the communists in the general people’s and national 
struggle against imperialist oppression, it is inconceivable that the Communist (Party) can be 
transformed into a real mass party, and without this the hegemony of the proletariat and 
Soviet power in their country is not to be thought of. 318 
It was crucial for Indian Communists to be actively involved in the national anti-imperialist struggle, 
both as a means of establishing working-class power within these organisations, but also to potentially 
become their vanguard. For too long, the Party had drawn a chasm between ‘class’ and ‘nation’, and 
now they had to ensure they presented these two strands as united in one struggle against British 
imperialism.  
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The Party’s Anti-Imperial History: 
The CPGB’s anti-imperialist credentials were as many scholars have noted, at its height between 1928 
and 1935. The League against Imperialism (LAI) became a particularly strong avenue for anti-
imperialist activism, developing strong internationalist ties between the capitalist core and the colonial 
peripheral states. The Party had during these years, firmly inculcated itself within the liberation of the 
colonies. Shapuri Saklatvala, M.P. for Battersea and the two Dutt brothers were both of Indian origin, 
allowing real practical ties to the policies of Empire. In-fact, whether that be R. P. Dutt’s India Today, 
or Saklatvala’s depth of political contacts, the two figures had a tremendous impact on the Indian 
labour movement. 319 During the Third Period, the Party had been involved in the formation of the 
CPI, and the creation of the Colonial Committee in 1925, as well as infamously, the Meerut trial in 
1929. 320 This debacle was the focus of much Party work, leading to the imprisonment of two British 
communists, Ben Bradley and Phillip Spratt. In-fact, following the Seventh World Congress, the 
ECCI placed Ben Bradley in charge of the affairs of the CPI, demonstrating both the Comintern’s 
appreciation of Bradley’s knowledge of Indian domestic politics and their inherent Eurocentrism. 321  
However, as Neil Redfern has recently argued, the Party failed to maintain a ‘sustained and practical 
solidarity with anti-colonial struggles’, which suggests that the ‘Meerut Conspiracy’ was somewhat of 
an exception in CPGB colonial activism. 322 The Meerut affair was undoubtedly the Party’s most 
obvious example of anti-imperialist activity – and was in many ways, the standard by which all 
subsequent activity was measured.  
As Callaghan has explained, ‘for the Communists, it was not enough to support pious resolutions for 
colonial independence…the centrality of India in the Party’s anti-colonial work was evident from the 
beginning.’323 British Communists were in a unique situation, as they had the job of disseminating 
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information on the oppressive nature of the British state, along with the British workers’ lack of 
solidarity with their colonial comrades. It was an issue which the CPGB battled with throughout its 
early history, as Walter Hannington lucidly expressed in 1925: 
Seldom does the British worker discuss such places as India and Egypt although they are 
British colonies. It is only with some crisis or sensational happening in these countries that he 
is aroused to a realisation that these countries are under British rule…We must show our 
solidarity with our Colonial brothers—victims of British imperialism. It is essentially the duty 
of the British workers to stand up in their defence. These crimes are committed in the name of 
the British nation, and unless the British workers manifest their opposition, our Egyptian and 
Indian comrades will for ever be entitled to point to us as hypocrites whenever we speak of 
International working-class solidarity.324 
Lenin termed this phenomenon, ‘white chauvinism’, which he understood as having deeply ‘infected’ 
British workers with a sense of paternalism, and at worst, a total disregard for colonial workers. The 
problem was that the working classes had become ‘completely merged with bourgeois policy’, he 
wrote in 1915.325 It is an ‘established fact’ that a ‘minority are ‘enjoying’ crumbs from colonial 
advantages, from privileges.326 As a 1937 document from the CPGB explained, Empire had created a 
false sense of identity among the working classes, offering ‘a nice, warm, comfortable feeling inside 
that you are part of one, big, happy family, all having a great time’.327 It was clear that Empire was a 
firm fixture in the mind of the British worker, as Dutt accused both the left and right of having a 
‘largely unconscious, deeply ingrained…imperialist outlook’.328 It was the ‘unspoken premise of all 
labour and trade union politics’, Dutt later expanded. 329 As the above document continued, ‘some 
workers will begin to feel that they actually own a piece of the British Empire. That’s the idea. It is 
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our Empire. We must defend it. Defend the family property.’ 330 The profits of Empire were 
maintaining the existence of Empire abroad, as British workers were indebted to the same exploitative 
system that undermined them at home.  
As many have noted, in the absence of a major anti-imperialist tradition, racism and Empire long 
clouded the thinking of British politics, even amongst the left. 331 As Macintyre has suggested, ‘the 
impact of Empire on the British proletarian consciousness was immensely powerful…for they 
considered the imperial question to lie outside the ambit of Labour politics’.332 The Party, to its credit, 
attempted to critique this long-running identification with Empire, though they were largely 
unsuccessful. John Callaghan has gone as far to suggest that beyond Saklatvala and Rajani Palme 
Dutt, they were the only figures in the British Communist Party who placed the same emphasis on 
anti-imperialism as Lenin, noting that most others had to be formally taught the policy. 333 Many were 
aware it was an uphill battle, as Bill Rust highlighted the endurance of racialist theories of white 
supremacy, commenting that they ‘have been soaked into the minds of British workers since 
childhood, [which is] why so many are workers are indifferent to the struggle of the Indian people.’ 334 
Nonetheless, the Party claimed they had successfully distanced themselves from this kind of 
‘backward’ thinking, as Pollitt claimed that the CPGB was ‘the only party that had broken down race 
and colour distinction’.335 It would not be wrong to assume this was the case, at least in theory, 
however, whether it filtered down to much practical solidarity is another matter.  
Democracy Now, Independence Later. 
The CPGB’s policy on India was geared towards the ‘granting’ of autonomy, with the key inclusion 
being that the British state was allowing India independence, at their own behest, rather that the 
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Indian people taking it themselves. Whilst a subtle difference, it demonstrates the Party’s belief that at 
least in the short-term, working within the established trade-union movement was far more likely than 
calling for immediate revolution. As Edmonds’ work has presented, ‘the political focus centred upon 
European and white colonial workers as agents of revolutionary change.’ 336 The Party was no doubt 
committed to a ‘free Indian state’, but how it was to be achieved, and what this entailed, was up for 
debate. 
The ‘Popular Front’ led to the Party lending its support for various democratic initiatives, proposed by 
both the British state and the Indian National Congress. There were drives for the establishment of a 
Constituent Assembly; support for the INC’s ‘All-India’ involvement in the Indian National Elections 
in 1937, and from 1942 onwards, the granting of post-war Indian independence, if there was support 
for the war effort. Consequently, the colonial question became a democratic question, not an 
imperialist one. National self-determination would be achieved through the ‘Popular Front’, with the 
INC as its vanguard. It was clear, for instance, that if any attempts at a Left Book Club were to be a 
success, it would have to be under the provision that ‘it gets the support of the whole congress’, Nehru 
declared. He continued, that ‘I think it will be advisable not to call it a LEFT Book Club, but 
Congress or Nationalist’, highlighting the CPI’s indebtedness to the broader national movement. 337 
The CPGB’s role was therefore to ‘fully appreciate our own tremendous responsibility in relation to 
the struggle for the liberation of the Indian people’, which broadly meant campaigning for greater 
democratic rights. 338 The British Government, who the Party repeatedly claimed had besmirched the 
country’s democratic image, was still held, at least in theory, as a positive political body. The British 
State was no-longer imperialist per-se, but one acting dishonestly, as Gallacher, in one Commons 
debate called upon the ‘Mother of Parliaments, a democratic institution… [to go] to the limit in the 
use of democratic institutions, before it brings in the bayonet and the bomb’. 339 It pervaded all 
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colonial activism, as in the case of Palestine, the problem lay in the Palestinians not being provided 
‘with the opportunity of having a Legislative Assembly’. 340 Again, on numerous occasions, Gallacher 
in Parliament called upon the Government to consider amending the 1935 Government of India Act, 
which showcased the CP’s position as that of extending democratic liberty, rather than ending British 
imperialism. 341  
However, not all believed the Party’s position was as authentic as they presented, as Henry N. 
Brailsford, the influential left-wing journalist, most well known as an associate of the ILP and the 
Communist-led Left Book Club, wrote in a review of R.P. Dutt’s ‘India Today’, that whilst ‘a useful 
contribution to history’, Dutt’s work was still dictated by the needs ‘of his party to smile on Congress, 
viewing its reformist programme with qualified approval’.342 Brailsford, much like Dutt, was regarded 
as an eminent authority on Indian issues, with the two more-or-less singing from the same hymn 
sheet. However, in this case, Brailsford’s comments nod towards Dutt’s own transformation on India 
during the ‘Popular Front’ period, as whilst he was undoubtedly the most prolific in the British Party 
regarding colonial issues; the question lies in whether he reflected the Party line on India - or was an 
exception. Dutt, in Callaghan’s view, became more involved in colonial work on his return to Britain 
in 1936, becoming ‘more dependent on Dutt’s personal input than at any other time – the Soviet 
Union having devolved all-day-to-day to constituent parties.’.343 Dutt in-fact, led many of the Party’s 
attempts at a ‘Popular Front’ anti-imperialism, becoming heavily involved in the India League, the 
publication Inside the Empire, as well as writing regular columns in Labour Monthly on India, 
becoming the Party’s spokesperson on imperial issues. 
He was not alone in appreciating the Indian issue, as Ben Bradley oversaw much of the Party’s 
Central Committee discussion on the country. These reports were often based upon promoting further 
work in the membership, or providing updates on the CPI’s relationship with the INC. As Bradley 
stated in April 1936: ‘our demands are a demand for all political persons; the freedom of press, 
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organisation and better housing and education…such a demand could be built upon and strengthened 
by the national liberation movement.’ 344 The INC was the vehicle of the national liberation 
movement and strengthening it from below was the object for the Party. Bradley pressed that, ‘it is 
essential that this question be more fully discussed in the Party lower organs…with the idea of 
threshing and clarifying the Party’s policy on the colonial question.’ 345A year later, Bradley proposed 
once again that a ‘new letter go out to the Districts on the importance of colonial work’, whilst adding 
that the monthly bulletin, Colonial Information, should be ‘sent to every branch of the Party’. 346  
Democracy, was the means to not only establish greater working-class representation, but also for 
them to fulfil their internationalist obligations, as it ‘cuts the ground from beneath fascisms feet and 
draws [them] into the system of collective security.’ 347 The Charter of Rights, they emphasised, was 
‘not an alternative to national self-determination’, but merely the ‘best path’ in the ‘immediate 
conditions’ to ‘meet the grave dangers of the fascist menace’. 348 That said, they did regard the ‘New 
Constitution’ as a sham, regarding it as another vestige of imperial rule.349 It was the ‘greatest fraud 
ever perpetuated on a nation’, according to Bradley, presenting, ‘not even the shadow of self-
government’.350  Democracy was regarded as a revolutionary advance, if it stemmed the advance of 
fascism, as it did in much of the West, however, in India, democracy was regarded more as a potential 
stopgap, rather than an immediate end, as we shall see in later years. Democracy was predicated on 
international obligations, rather than any innate desire for Indian self-governance, as the Party still 
overwhelmingly viewed its own role as more paramount in forging any ‘democratic progress’ than 
domestic factors.  
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Cracks Begin to Emerge - Outsiders Once Again? 
The failure of the ‘Cripps Mission’ in 1942, demonstrated that the Party were not alone in failing to 
appreciate the desires of the INC or wider Indian opinion. As Yasmin Khan’s recent work has 
underlined, the Cripps Mission reflected the divergence in British and Indian opinion, as its ‘rationale 
and failure can be explained by the daily drama of war in India in early 1942’. 351 The mission, to 
quote a national paper, was ’30 months too late’. 352 However, the CPGB’s explanation for its failure, 
was because it failed to undertake the ‘one issue that mattered – the establishment of a responsible 
National Government with effective powers for Indian participation in the war.’353  The Cripps 
Mission, Dutt proposed was as simple as ‘plainly recognising the principle of Indian independence; 
and by establishing, a representative National Government’. 354 Supporting the war effort was 
paramount, as the Party wholeheartedly believed that the time was not right for Indian independence. 
Ben Bradley, drew an equivalence between not supporting the war effort and a failing national 
movement, fearing that ’to crush the Indian national movement is to ensure that there will be no 
national resistance to the fascist aggressors’.355 The mission failed not because it failed to cater 
towards a growing current of pro-independence opinion, but because, ‘under cover of the dubious 
post-war plan, it rejected out of hand the one issue that mattered – the establishment of a responsible 
National Government with effective powers for Indian participation in the war.’ 356  
Most Indians discredited the Cripps Mission for entirely different reasons however, as the mission 
was regarded by much of Indian opinion as ‘a post-date cheque on a bank which is already 
crashing.’357 This was not the only instance of the CPGB misunderstanding the Indian political 
climate, as the Party’s support for the CPI position on the ‘Quit India’ campaign demonstrated the 
Party’s chasm with the mainstream anti-colonial movement. They were, once again, outsiders, as the 
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campaign ‘shattered left unity in India’. 358 The CPI gained traction whilst most Congress leaders 
were imprisoned, as their very legality was due to their enthusiastic support for the British war effort. 
In a moment of political chaos, it was ironic that the CPI, a Communist Party, came to be regarded 
‘with unprecedented favour in government circles’.359  
R.P. Dutt’s editorial in Labour Monthly, summarised the Party’s view on the movement, denouncing 
both the British government and the Congress Leaders as benefiting fascism. He wrote that they were 
‘the two halves of reactionary policy’, which ‘fit one another like the two hands of a pair of gloves.’360 
Dutt reimagined the ‘Quit India’ movement as a nation striving for ‘equal access’ in the worldwide 
anti-fascist struggle, rather than as a desire for national independence. Gandhi was a ‘pacifist, evil 
genius’, whose policy of non-co-operation was stemming the real anti-fascism of Nehru and the INC. 
In an act of severe miscalculation, Dutt squared the acts of civil obedience as a reaction to the arrests, 
rather than as means of civil disobedience in of themselves. The arrests had ‘precipitated the open 
conflict and disorders…for it was the arrests which provoked the disorders, not disorders which 
provoked the arrests.’ 361 The decision to threaten civil obedience was a ‘disastrous step for the fate of 
India’ according to Clemens Dutt in August 1942. 362 Although the CPGB continually called for the 
release of the Congress leaders, their motivation was based upon support in the war effort, not on any 
ideological solidarity. In-fact, a letter sent from Pollitt to Churchill noted that: 
We deplore this threat of civil disobedience and believe that any such policy, inevitably 
leading to division and internal struggle in the face of Fascist aggression, and thus playing 
into the hands of fascism, would be suicidal from the standpoints of the interests of Indian 
freedom - no less than of the world cause of freedom against Fascism…we urge that the 
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government immediately and without preliminary conditions re-open negotiations with the 
INC.363 
Their settlement proposed recognition of Indian independence and the creation of a provisional 
national government, however, none of these vague hypotheticals would realistically satisfy Indian 
political opinion, so heavily swayed towards immediate independence. As Nehru responded, the same 
month: 
Without recognition of our basic standpoint of an immediate declaration of independence, any 
round-table conference would be going back to the old method…the whole conception of 
having us sit at the feet of power is repugnant to us.364 
Nehru, a figure ultimately sympathetic to communism, contextualised the British’s continued support 
for war and Empire, and its refusal to grant the Indian National Congress self-autonomy. 365 He 
argued, that the British could not hope for India’s support in the fight against fascism, and for 
democracy, if it refused to allow the Indian people to democratise their own system. 366 Whilst, 
Nehru’s sympathies were undoubtedly anti-fascist, he did regard fascism as merely an intensification 
of imperialism, claiming that it would be ‘illogical and absurd’ to fail to condemn both. 367  
Interestingly, the ‘calibre’ of many Indian politicians was judged on the authenticity of their ‘anti-
fascism’, which increasingly became a yardstick to judge the Party’s support for anti-imperialist 
politics. On numerous occasions, Pollitt and others emphasised the anti-fascism of the Indian people, 
whilst The Daily Worker remarked positively on an ‘Aid to Spain’ meeting in London in March 1937, 
led by Shapurji Saklatavala’s wife. 368 Even R.P.Dutt based support for India on a shared anti-fascist 
solidarity, as he emphasised the Indian’s own nascent anti-fascist activism: “today they are organising 
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support for Spain; they have Indian doctors, Indian medical aid in Spain, and in the streets of Bombay 
collections are being taken for Spanish democracy.” 369 Whilst this was not an assessment removed 
from reality, as the INC condemned fascism in Spain; expressed solidarity with the Republicans, and 
raised food, funds and medical assistance for the Spanish cause, the Party based support on India on a 
perceived anti-fascist solidarity, rather than as one overtly anti-imperial. 370 Ultimately for the CPGB, 
the Indian domestic position was irrelevant, as European Fascism must be stopped, even if it meant 
defending British imperial interests.  In the Party’s view, imperialism was a creed which must be 
fought, but after the defeat of fascism, not before. As such, the Party repeatedly reiterated that Indian 
involvement in the war was crucial, as Ben Bradley spelled out in May 1943:  
We must bring pressure on the government to end immediately the policy of repression; 
release all political prisoners, and reopen negotiations with Congress leaders, and leaders of 
other political organisations on the question of the immediate establishment of a composite 
Provisional Government for India. 371 
Instead of mass civil disobedience, the correct response was to call for a ‘People’s War’, where the 
Indian worker would ‘rise to his full height, realising that he is producing goods for the war of his 
people’. The CPI declared that the war ‘opens a straight and simple path for the Indian revolution’ 
asserting that ‘patriotic instinct’ would allow unity and victory.372 However, this line was largely 
against the grain of Indian opinion, as most Indians were understandably disinterested in European 
fascism, as their immediate enemy was the British imperial state and Empire. The change to the 
‘People’s War line’, as Windmiller and Overstreet have suggested, ‘became only in touch with reality 
with the Japanese invasion of Indian territory’. 373 
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Redefining Imperialism: 
The Party’s definition of ‘imperialism’ was perhaps the most obvious example of the Party’s shift in 
thinking. As whilst it always understood imperialism in the same manner, its application became a 
kind of buzz-word, used when the situation suited, rather than as a conscious ideological category.374 
Imperialism in Leninist terms was the pinnacle of capitalism, as it followed Marx’s dictum that, 
capitalism ‘planted the seeds for its own destruction’.375 In Lenin’s view, capital could not circumvent 
the problem of falling levels of profit in the core capitalist countries, meaning to survive, capitalism 
would have to expand into areas of the world where it had previously been scarce.376 Capital in the 
core countries, such as Great Britain, had become ‘over-ripe’, exhausting its potential for expansion 
because of the impoverishment of the masses. As a result, capital’s potential for expansion in these 
‘new markets’ led to increasingly higher profits, as well as a division between ‘developed’ and 
‘undeveloped’ nations. Imperialism was not necessarily intrinsic to capitalism, as Luxemburg thought, 
but was the result of inter-imperialist rivalry. 377 It was certainly something the Comintern should 
critique, and yet with the arrival of European fascism, Western Communists took a wholly atomised 
approach to imperialism.  
Imperialism became, not the most barbaric expression of capitalism, but something certain nations 
engaged in more heavily than others. Britain, particularly with its colonies in India and much of 
Africa, seemingly undertook a more benevolent form than its fascist counterparts. Much of this 
ambiguity is because the CPGB’s anti-imperialism was drawn from two conflicting avenues. The 
Party, much alike to the British Labour movement had not undergone a fundamental reimagining 
along anti-imperialist lines. Rather, the Party balanced between being an authentic ‘anti-imperialist’ 
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Party, alongside a nascent trend of ‘white labourism’. As Satnam Virdee’s recent work has 
demonstrated, the English working class has often harboured racist sentiments, as well as 
simultaneously, a working-class anti-racism, noting that these expressions are ‘not necessarily 
artefacts of two different parts of the working class…but rather, on occasion entwined’.378 Baring this 
in mind, the CPGB’s position on imperialism, in the absence of any theoretical solidity, fluctuated 
between these two competing currents of thought at any one moment - much to the annoyance of the 
Comintern and seasoned members such as Saklatvala. Imperialism, ignoring a few exceptions, was 
mostly understood as primarily an economic relationship, one of violent suppression, but also an 
opportunity to emphasize the inherent paternalism of much of the British left. The argument went that 
the most industrialised nations were those whose opportunities were ripest for revolution, whereas 
those who bore the brunt of the imperial system, were not yet sufficiently ‘ripe’ for revolutionary 
agitation. As such, workers in the Global North, were given the responsibility of handing freedom and 
independence to the colonial workers, after they themselves had been liberated.  
Much of the CPGB’s message, other than what were at times, ritualistic demands for independence, 
were geared towards the economic arguments of Empire. On numerous occasions, the ‘problems’ of 
Empire were talked of not in terms of exploitation or brutality, but rather in its effect on wages here at 
home in the Imperial country. Even during the Class against Class period, it was an argument 
repeatedly made – Shapurji Saklatvala for example in the House of Commons in 1929. decried the 
maintenance of possessions of Empire in India, China and Africa, ‘as the undoing of the standard of 
labour not only for the British people, but for European and Western peoples also’. 379 For Soviet 
Britain, the Party’s first proto ‘Popular Front’ document declared that ‘it is the plunder of India and 
the other colonies that enables the ruling class to wage class struggle in this country’. 380 ‘It is this 
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reason why the struggle of British workers must be bound up with the struggle of the colonial masses 
– it is a common fight against a common enemy’.381 The Party’s emphasis may have been dictated by 
the need to prioritise domestic issues, as Labourism always had. For many involved in the wider-
Labour movement, international issues were relegated to the periphery, as ‘people wanted to know 
more about the unemployed and things that concerned them’. 382  
It was something the Party battled with throughout the inter-war years, as the majority population 
were imbued with a deeply ingrained racial prejudice that aligned their thinking to the colonial model. 
In this sense, Malika Sherwood’s assessment that the Party reflected the attitudes of the era are 
correct, however, senior Party figures largely fought an uphill battle against mainstream indifference, 
which at times bordered on blatant ignorance of international issues. In 1930, Idris Cox suggested that 
communists had placed too much emphasis on politicising worldwide struggle, as the Party accepted 
that slogans such as 'Defend the Soviet Union' or 'Hands off India' were of ‘minor relevance’ to 
workers in Shipley or Huddersfield battling wage reductions.383 It was a tightrope the Party delicately 
balanced for many years, as they had to appease those who dismissed them solely as a ‘foreign policy 
Party’, but also maintain their internationalist credentials, both to satisfy the demands of the 
Comintern, and members in their sister parties, such as the CPI. 
Japanese Fascism: The Revival of Orientalist Narratives 
The onset of war itself was viewed as a means of driving down the supply for British goods, and thus 
reducing wages at home. Following the Japanese invasion of China, the CPGB made various attempts 
to organise solidarity based on boycotts. Boycotts, alongside various others humanitarian aid drives 
were evidence of the Party’s continuing evolution, as the Party’s activism in the late thirties was based 
on maintaining respectability. It was something most evident in the Party’s work during the Spanish 
Civil War, as Lewis Mates’ research in the North East has reached much of the same conclusion, 
noting that many Party members ‘were likely to have achieved respectability as a result of their party 
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membership not being widely known’. 384 In-fact, the Party’s initiatives on China were founded on a 
belief that to do any differently would ‘frighten away the progressive forces to the right of the 
CPGB’.385 The ‘China Campaign Committee’, was indicative of the ‘Popular Front’ era initiative, 
seeking broad, populist support. For example, the CCC enticed all branches to make ‘patient 
approaches to local Labour Parties to secure their co-operation on China…especially in regard to the 
boycott, sanctions and the unloading of Japanese ships in British ports’.  386 The CCC connected 
British consumer demand as abetting Japanese fascism, as the Party were horrified that British pounds 
were ‘financing raids of death’. 387 Presumably, they were only following the lead of international 
Comintern directives, which regarded Japanese imperialism as a direct threat to the USSR, stating 
that:  
The peoples of Asia are menaced by Japanese imperialism. From both the West and East, the 
fascist cut-throats are preparing an onslaught on the great land of socialism, the fatherland of 
all working people. 388 
The Daily Worker later followed suit, calling for all dockers and seamen to resist loading Japanese 
boats.389 The Party policy was linked to workers at home, as Pollitt bemoaned that ‘skilled workers in 
Lancashire are driven into unemployment because the National Government’s policy of encouraging 
Japanese aggression has practically destroyed the China market for British goods’.390 Britain were 
being excluded from the global imperial supply chain, as one CPGB leaflet, called for a boycott of 
Japanese silk, arguing that ‘just as the aggressor in Europe plans to dominate the Western world, so 
Japan aims to rule over the East, completely excluding Britain’ 391  
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However, in-keeping with much of the Party work on the colonies, the issue was not carried through 
with the readiness the Political Bureau had hoped. The PB declared on October 1st that ‘some sections 
of the Party have been very slow to respond to the measures sent to them and should take the matter 
up immediately’.392 That said, the Party membership cannot be blamed for a lack of practical 
solidarity with the colonies, if the Party’s own circulation on the subject was limited. Ignoring the 
Party’s own theoretical problems, which was regularly alluded to; the Party’s own learning material 
featured a meagre two lines on imperialism, with 5 of the 8 points directed towards fascism and/or 
defence of the Soviet Union. 393 Bearing in mind this theoretical ambiguity, it is unsurprising that 
imperialism came to be thought of as a kind of moral degeneration - an infection within the national 
psyche - rather than a real political ideology. As early as 1935, this thinking was prevalent in the 
CPGB, as Idris Cox regarded imperialism as something intrinsic to a people’s national make-up, 
noting ‘we have to recognise that the strongest force in the government is pro-German’. 394 It was the 
very-same rhetoric that allowed the Chamberlain government to become ‘proto-fascist’, in its drive to 
lead the country away from its ‘real history’.  
The ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Imperialism: 
Increasingly, the Party became marred by a theoretical distinction between the past and present, as 
J.R. Campbell reported in 1938 that there was a clear difference between the ‘old’ and ‘new 
imperialisms’. He stated that ‘under the old Imperialism there was – in time of peace – a measure of 
liberty and of conscience’. It was a complete re-writing of the Party’s understanding of imperialism, 
as the Party declared that this new fascist brand ‘is out to wipe Parliamentary democracy from the 
face of the Earth – it is out to exterminate socialism and trade unionism by fire and sword’. 395 
However, it was not a view the Party took to immediately following Hitler’s ascension to power. 
Rajani Palme Dutt in January 1935 warned in Labour Monthly that ‘we need more than ever to warn 
the workers to become entangled in the lines of imperialist policies’ citing alertness to any potential 
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refurbishing of imperialist ‘national defence’.396 Krishna Menon made much of the same analysis in 
1938, explicitly stating that: 
In the event of such a world war taking place there is a grave danger of Indian man power and 
resources being utilised for the purposes of British imperialism, and it is therefore necessary 
for the Congress to warn the country again against this and prepare it to resist such 
exploitation of India and her people. No credits must be voted for such a war and voluntary 
subscriptions and war loans must not be supported, and all other war preparations resisted. 397 
Dutt’s comments demonstrate the theoretical uncertainty which coursed through much of the 
Comintern’s line during this period. It was confused, at times haphazard and most notably, 
inconsistent. Despite many of the articles that claimed the contrary, the Party were unsure how to 
cope with an increasingly prevalent fascist international, alongside their long-running theory on 
imperialism. It presented a dilemma for the Comintern - how would they remain ‘anti-imperialist’, if 
defence of the Soviet Union necessitated allying with the original imperialist states, to stall the ‘new’ 
Germanic, fascist imperialism? It was a tight-rope for the CPGB - a minor distinction and one they 
failed to differentiate between - as instead, their analysis as Morgan maintains, became a ‘take it or 
leave it’ type policy, as ‘they saw not new revolutionary opportunities but a threat to positions already 
won.’ 398  
Fascism was, as a letter to the Party’s membership described, the collusion of ‘the most reactionary, 
most imperialist and aggressive section of monopoly capitalism’.399 Whilst, ‘fascist aggression’ was 
according to a 1937 document, ‘the struggle for new markets and spheres of cheap colonial labour; for 
raw materials and more profitable outlets for capital investment’. 400 Yet, the above description was 
exactly the same as the one Lenin outlined as ‘imperialistic’ in 1916. 401 Imperialism had modelled its 
methods on fascism, with its disregard for colonial peoples and use of violence, rather than the other 
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way around. It is what allowed the Abyssinian situation to be regarded, not solely as an imperialist 
attack, but a fascist one.402 The Party became thoroughly involved in the ‘Hands off Abyssinia’ 
campaign, viewing the League of Nations as an arbiter of peace - denouncing the British Government 
for ‘emasculating’ the League and ‘wrecking collective security’.403 The PB appreciated its formative 
role, detailing that the Party must ‘hold as many meetings as possible and try to get the Trade 
Councils to convene working class conferences to discuss the Abyssinian situation’.404  
The Welsh stalwart, Arthur Horner in a document from 1936, reflected much of this theoretical 
ambiguity, as he showed little distinction between British imperialism and Fascism, stating that ‘their 
treatment of the peoples of Ireland, India, and the Crown Colonies, all prove that they will use Fascist 
methods just as readily as their Italian, German, Austrian, and Spanish friends.’405 Fascism was a 
trick, and an act of deception used by the capitalist elites to maintain their vested interests, as the 
German people had been ‘tricked and deceived at the end of the war; tricked and deceived all the 
years that followed’.406 And whilst the Party undoubtedly regarded British imperialism as a 
malevolent force, Horner’s comments demonstrate that there was a degree of amnesia about 
imperialism’s past, and its continued operations in the present.  
This was the line until September 1939, as in an article titled, Colonies and Fascism, the document  
declared that only the ‘crushing of Fascist influence will clear the way for development of the struggle 
with greater vigour against their imperial masters.’407 It made evidently clear that the fight against 
fascism took precedence over the fight against imperialism, as fascism was increasingly understood as 
an obstacle to any colonial democratic aspirations. The Party’s statement at the National Peace 
Congress in Bristol in May 1938 outlined this view, stating that they should not defend British 
imperialism, but that any ‘sharing of the spoils’ among the Fascist powers would be ‘no solution to 
the evils of British imperialism’. Instead, it suggested, that ‘the character of fascist domination, would 
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mean the destruction of even the limited rights…that have been precariously won by the colonial 
people’s’. 408 Imperialism was an evil, but a necessary evil in this moment, as it became viewed as a 
more discernible and manageable enemy than fascism. However, it was a significant reworking of 
conventional Leninist doctrine, as Lenin in Imperialism, denounced those who sought to: 
Simply to compare colonies with non-colonies, one imperialism with another imperialism - 
one semi-colony or colony with all other countries is to evade and to obscure the very essence 
of the question.409 
As Neil Redfern has suggested, the Party saw ‘in the developing crisis of imperialism, not new 
revolutionary opportunities, but a threat to positions already won’. 410 Defence of the nation meant the 
defence of its imperial borders. It was the potential for alliance, and the placing of Britain alongside 
the interests of the Soviet Union, that led Dutt to state that:  
‘Fascism is now faced by a non-imperialist coalition of states and peoples, uniting the 
democratic aspirations of the peoples of the world, combining its leadership with the two 
democratic imperialist powers, with the socialist power and the national republic which is the 
vanguard of the colonial peoples’. 411  
Ben Bradley, one of the Party’s stalwarts on anti-imperialist thinking took leave of his senses in mid-
1943, as he called for urgent action, as the Japanese are ‘battering at India’s gates’. He continued, 
‘Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, Borneo, Java: one after the other, the enemy seemed to walk 
through our defences as a knife goes through butter.’ 412 It may be difficult, Bradley conceded, to 
‘convince all the Indian people’ that the Japanese do not come as ‘saviours to India, to rescue its 
people from its English rulers’. The answer was to offer more than empty promises, and to seek the 
establishment of a Provisional War Government in India. 413 The Party became progressively less 
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interested in anti-imperialist work, and in-turn, more subordinate to the British national interest. 
Pollitt’s letter to Nehru on 27th July 1942, stated that ‘everything else in life is subordinate to the 
USSR: ‘I assure you, Comrade Nehru, that I hate British imperialism as deeply as you yourself 
do…but at this moment when socialism is being butchered and battered as it is in the Soviet Union…I 
am ready to co-operate with ALL who are prepared to fight against fascism.’414 It was clear, that even 
victims of colonialism should not directly confront their oppressors at this moment. Dutt, in Labour 
Monthly, bluntly dispelled any such criticism, ‘whoever, whether English or Indian, places obstacles 
in the way of such co-operation, is in-fact…assisting Hitler and Japan, and therefore acting against the 
interests of both the Indian people and the people of this country.’ 415  
Pollitt went further in the aftermath of the Japanese invasion of Malaya and the Far-East, demanding 
that ‘whoever tries in any way to support the enemy brands himself a traitor who should be shout out 
of hand’. 416 Full mobilisation was necessary, as the British government had failed to utilise the 
‘millions of peoples in the British Empire’ whose ‘profound anti-fascist sympathies’ could be used in 
the war. 417 ‘Only 0.25% of men had been recruited to the army’, Dutt scorned, and yet ‘the authorities 
wring their hands over the problems of man-power’. 418 ‘For too long the battle for production has 
been fought with kids gloves on’, Pollitt declared in typical fashion, highlighting the Party’s role as 
enthusiastic defenders of British manufacturing. 419 It was clear the Party had fully nationalized their 
communism, so long as their internationalism was loyalty to the Soviet Union.  
Britain and India: A Socialist New World Order? 
The Party’s view of India and the post-war settlement was in many ways dictated by its changing 
view of the post-war world. It was geared towards fraternal relationships, mutual co-operation and 
collective security, in which the Soviet Union was an equal player. The Party policy on the colonies, 
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was not a hazy miscalculation of the post-war order, but a reflection of, what appeared, real allied 
promises of colonial freedom and international co-operation. This meant that a progressive, socially 
attune Britain could engage in trade relationships with its former colonies. It was not a Socialist 
Empire, as many in the 1920s had envisioned, but a democratic, ‘post-Empire’ with socialism in the 
embryo. Free trade, fraternal relations and post-war peace were the bedrock to these new agreements 
– which a ‘People’s Front’ government would lead.  Orientalist conceptions of imperialism and the 
perceived benefits for western workers, meant that ideas of a post-capitalist, post-war society 
conveniently figured a form of ‘socialist commonwealth’, rather than any immediate self-
determination.  
In 1937, Pollitt spoke to the Party’s Congress, noting with a presumptuous attitude that ‘unity with the 
colonial peoples not only corresponds to our common interests…it also assists in securing the 
overthrow of British Imperialism and the building of Socialism by the fraternal exchange, and use of 
our common resources’. 420 In a pamphlet entitled, The Plain Man’s Guide to the Coronation, the 
Party proposed that through class solidarity and the extension of ‘democratic liberties’, the Party 
would be able to ‘join our colonial brothers and sisters in the Socialist Commonwealth’.421 This was 
represented in Dutt’s later comments that the British wanted a ‘durable friendship’ with the colonial 
people’s based ‘upon equal rights’ amounting to a ‘new, close fraternal association’. 422 It is clear that 
the idea of a ‘Socialist Commonwealth’ penetrated the Party in the late 1930s, largely because the 
Party abandoned any overtly anti-imperialist line, which could affect its broader populist base. 
Instead, its application would occur organically, without harm and disagreement - as it was certainly 
not a revolutionary struggle, but more a ‘realisation’ of being, or ‘full-nation consciousness’ (to flip 
the Marxist understanding). As an article in the Daily Worker in 1937 proclaimed:  
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This Britain will conquer. And on that day, the workers, in all their majesty, dignity and 
power, will so organise the resources of this country, in fraternal alliance with the freed 
peoples of present subject colonial countries. 423 
The Party believed that the old order was in decay. Fascism would be defeated and a new world order 
- one of international co-operation - would allow the Soviet Union to thrive alongside the capitalist 
powers. The League of Nations would be the arbiter of this new peace, inaugurating a ‘new era of 
equal and friendly relations, entirely favourable to the fullest development of international trading and 
co-operation.’ 424 It was an international alliance, which ‘all presumed newly liberated nations will 
desire to enter’, provided, their rights were recognised.425 The League would provide the opportunity 
for a new international order, empty of imperialism and exploitation, as the post-war world would 
create an ‘immense export market’ where India, ‘liberated from the yoke of British imperialism’, will 
‘at last be able to build their own economy and develop their own industry.’ 426 And whilst, this 
rhetoric was present during the ‘Class against Class’ period, the difference lay in its application. The 
post-war, ‘mutually beneficial’ relationships were framed within the Party’s new understanding of 
social progress - whereas previously, any socialist fraternal relationship would occur following the 
imminent collapse of capitalism.  
Much of the CPGB’s language became clouded by Eurocentric assumptions of what was best for the 
colonial people, as whilst the formal mechanisms of imperialism melted away, the colonies were still 
thought of in terms, of what benefited the Global North, first and foremost. It was, what Edward Said, 
and post-colonial scholars have termed orientalism; of a positional superiority, ‘which puts the 
Westerner in a whole series of possible relationships with the Orient, without ever losing him the 
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relative upper hand’. 427 Said continues, that many ideologies of potential liberation became tainted, 
however implicit, by the assumptions of superiority– for they were the ‘children of imperialism’. 428  
The Party became imbued with this type of thinking, balancing calls for self-determination, alongside 
arguments that the British workers would not be economically disadvantaged. D.N. Pritt, a Labour 
M.P., long a friend of the Communist Party and regular contributor to Labour Monthly announced that 
a ‘new India’, will not see any material losses to the British electorate – as he evoked the long-running 
argument that freedom for the colonies would not be detrimental to British income. Instead, it would 
lead to an ‘immense increase in productivity’, and a ‘better customer’. 429 In fact, it was ‘sober 
realism’ to imagine a world order built on the tenants of ‘tranquillity and progress’ in which all the 
peoples and nations in Asia ‘can take their share’. 430 A 1938 pamphlet by J.R. Campbell, made much 
of the same argument, declaring that self-determination, ‘would not deprive the British workers’ 
government of the possibility of obtaining colonial food-stuffs, and raw materials in exchange for 
British manufactured products.’431 In-spite of what the CPGB said, much Indian opinion, made 
substantially clear that any post-war connection would be based on the renouncing of imperialist 
thinking. As Jawaharlal Nehru, declared in March 1937: 
Independence means national freedom in the fullest sense of the word; it means, as our pledge 
has stated, a severance of the British connection. It means anti-imperialism and no 
compromise with Empire…We shall have close contacts, with all progressive countries, 
including England, IF she sheds her imperialism.432 
However, the Party to its detriment, never allied post-war construction with a systematic shedding of 
imperialism. It was only briefly, and normally from Dutt’s pen, that any anti-imperialist thinking 
occurred, as the Party later followed what the document The Empire and the War, argued against: 
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All this vague talk about improving the mandate system, of reforming imperialism or making 
the resources of the colonial countries available to all-comers, is purely reactive and 
deceptive. 433  
Whilst many members were undoubtedly anti-imperialists, they viewed the post-war order as one of 
natural change, in which all nations were given equal rights and participation. As Redfern has 
outlined, they believed that ‘imperialism was suffering a strategic defeat by ‘progressive’ forces and 
that colonial freedom would follow the defeat of fascism’.434 Dutt said so much in April 1942, 
proposing that any questions of the post-war order ‘cannot be separated from the governing questions 
of action and participation in the war’, going so far as to state that those who refused to fight against 
fascism, would revoke their right from any involvement in post-war reconstruction.435 Dutt was no 
doubt irked on by the policy of the Soviet Union, as he welcomed the ‘international economic 
collaboration’ in the Breton Woods Agreement in 1944, 436 whilst A Guide to the Problems of India, 
summarised that Indian national interests cannot be regarded in isolation, but ‘must coincide, as they 
can and do in truth coincide, with the common interests of all nations, and specifically of the UN, of 
victory over fascism’.437 As Evan Smith’s work has presented, the literature of the Popular Front 
shaped the Party’s post-war colonial relations in situating its argument on the colonies, around what 
was in the interest of both independent nations. However, much of this was predicated on a ‘presumed 
shared imperial history which would mean that the former colonies would want to deal with Britain 
exclusively’, rather than on the basis of any authentic anti-imperialism. 438  
Conclusion: 
To conclude, the CPGB was essentially pedalling the anti-colonialist line within the broader, global 
fight against fascism. It was not an issue they ignored, nor one they did not effectively campaign for, 
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but rather, one conveniently overlooked as an afterthought, and campaigned for ceremoniously. It 
became a highly individualised concept, something adopted or disregarded, according to the situation, 
and engaged with more seriously by some than others. Even seasoned members, such as R.P. Dutt and 
Ben Bradley, were who were very much exceptions to the rule in the beginning, began to bang the 
same drum as many of the Party’s more nationally attuned comrades. Internationalism became 
defence of the Soviet Union, overriding all other considerations, and when this required becoming one 
of the nation’s most sterling defenders, the Party played the tune. The Party became imbued with a 
kind of post-colonial paternalism where they assumed that a fraternal relationship, in which the 
colonies would voluntarily align themselves with a Socialist Britain, was inevitable. Crucially, it was 
the shift to the ‘Popular Front’ line that brought this thinking into question, as Pollitt resolutely 
believed that it was an international struggle against Nazism, not a European one. Nazi Germany 
could only be defeated with the help of the colonies, not without them. The fight against fascism was 
the immediate struggle, and the fight for democratic liberties would follow suit. Anti-imperialism, 
could wait, for anti-fascism was the Party’s bread and butter. 
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Conclusion: 
 
The CPGB in the ‘Popular Front’ period became a Party which viewed its preoccupations nationally. 
It was a change which they situated, both as a means of social advance and democratic defence. 
Fighting fascism was to be emphasised above all considerations, as the national and international 
questions became blurred. As laid out in the introduction, this dissertation regards the CPGB during 
the ‘Popular Front’ years as a ‘social patriot’ Party, which viewed Britain’s demise, as well as its 
ultimate progression, as one of identity and working-class representation. The National Government 
led by Chamberlain, had failed the British people precisely because he had abandoned what the Party 
viewed as its moral foundations. The solution became a cosmetic one, as the Party sought to remove 
Chamberlain from office and elect the Labour Party in its place. In this sense, the CPGB became a 
pressure group upon the Labour Party, whose new-found influence, both at a local and national level 
was overwhelmingly due to its language of betrayal and calls for a revitalised culture. The 
Communists, as many Trotskyist historians have maintained, betrayed its revolutionary stature during 
this period, veering away from their original credentials. However, it is unfair to berate the Party for 
this ideological shift, given that all Communist Parties across the globe were doing the same. National 
particularities were not simply another change in Party line, but a natural result of the Party’s 
disastrous policies during the Third Period. As such, the Party must be situated within a national 
context, as ‘for all of its cross-class national unity, the Second World War was a period when 
considerations of class permeated every aspect of social and political debate – and where debates 
about the working-class inevitably implied claims about its position in the nation’. 439  
Within this broader context, the ‘Popular Front’ gave the Party a new-found legitimacy, as they very 
much set the cultural agenda through their affiliated organisations, such as the Left Book Club. And 
whilst these do not paint the Party as one with national scope, as it remained a largely small electoral 
force, its success on the left, as arbiters of this new ‘left’ national culture meant it was ‘national’ in 
scope, so much as, the working-classes were understood as the bedrock of the nation. That said, as 
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established in the second chapter, the Party’s success on the national level during the Popular Front, 
cannot be said to be replicated on the international scene. The Party began to pedal a distorted 
revision of Marxist theories of imperialism, which situated the Party’s role as defenders of all the 
British nation, including its colonial territories. In many ways, the Party’s policy on the imperialist 
question can be understood as representative for the Party’s overall ‘Popular Front’ stance – being 
contradictory, haphazard, and disjointed, unsure whether to commit to fully, or repeat clichés of 
democratic rights and ‘full-independence’. Many of the Party’s stalwarts on India, found themselves 
in a minority, fighting against a largely apathetic - no doubt theoretically on-board - stream of anti-
imperialist politics. Dutt, alongside his brother Clemens and a few others, were largely left on their 
own regarding Indian self-determination, however, even R.P. Dutt and Ben Bradley increasingly 
began to reflect the Party’s rugged patriotic line, as the war reached its closing stages. That said, the 
Party’s anti-imperialist efforts, whilst undoubtedly found wanting in comparison to their sterling work 
in the late 1920s, must be viewed within the Party’s broader focus.  
For the CPGB, anti-fascism was a black and white issue. It was paramount, as ‘everything else is 
secondary to this’, Pollitt remarked. 440 It was a ‘life-and-death struggle’, for which the working class 
must ‘stand out as the most determined upholder of national and international unity’, Dutt declared in 
1942.441 Internationally, this line left no possible space for any anti-imperialist element between June 
1941-1945, as to do so would damage the fight against fascism, whilst nationally, a politics of 
Englishness, echoing a forgotten English past, became harder to stand alongside, an authentic workers 
internationalism. Consequently, it is unsurprising that the Party and its leaders began to prioritise 
certain issues over others, despite their best intentions. As whilst the Party undoubtedly did not do 
‘enough’ on the issue, many individual Party members were more overtly anti-imperialist than the 
dominant stream of opinion in the country and failed precisely because their lofty ambitions were 
incapable of being realised - rather than for their lack of commitment. Conclusively, their success, 
between 1935-1939, was built on the adoption of an anti-war, reformist programme, whilst from 
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1942, through to the end of the war, they capitalised on a nascent, national collective spirit, created in 
the melting pot of war. For the Party were re-imagined in the ‘Popular Front’, becoming consumed by 
questions of national identity, war, and fascism, alongside above-all, the defence of the USSR.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
98 
 
Bibliography:  
 
Primary Sources: 
Communist Party Archive (Microfilm) 
Central Committee 1934-1937.  
Political Bureau 1935-1938.  
CP/328.521 – 1907-1940 (Box 72): 
Rust, William. India’s Fight for Separation and Independence. [undated document] 
The Empire and the War, War Library, no.10. 1940.CPGB. p.14. 
‘India’s Problems’ with foreword by Ben Bradley – From the Indian CP, ‘People’s War’. 
Communist Party of India Leaflet. Introduction by Harry Pollitt. September 1942 
CP/IND/BRAD/6/9  
Left Book Club in India. 
CP/IND/DUTT/31/04. 
January 15th, 1938, ‘Make it a United Crusade for Peace and Plenty!’ 
17 February 1938: ‘The Song of the Crusade’. 
CP/IND/DUTT/31/05  
The Crusade for the Defence of the British People, Jan 16th, 1939.  
‘May 6th, 1939, ‘Can Conscription Save Peace’, Pollitt. 
Conscription – For What? R.P.Dutt, DW, April 3rd 1939. 
CP.IND/DUTT/29/12  
Pollitt Speech. 
CP/IND/POLL/05/  
What is Fascism? Political letter to CPGB membership, April 25th 1939. 
Harry Pollitt - Three Years since the 7th Congress. 
CP/IND/POLL/2/5  
Harry Pollitt, First Visits to Spain, February 1937 – September 1938.  
CP/ORG/MISC/2/14  
“Innocent Purchasers Finance Raids of Death”, leaflet.  
Henry Noel Brailsford Archive. 
HNB/30  
99 
 
H.N.B (Press Cuttings on India) ‘Indians on India’ 1935-1940. – 24th August 1940 – Review of Dutt’s 
‘India To-Day’. 
Labour Monthly: 
An Education Contrast: Schools at the Cross-Roads: Book Review by A.F.B. Labour Monthly. January 
1936. 
British Foreign Policy. R.P. Arnot. Labour Monthly. December 1935. 
Britons in Spain. William Rust. Review by Walter Cramer. Labour Monthly. March 1939. 
Chartism and the Fight for Peace. Salme A. Dutt. Labour Monthly. June 1939. 
Chartism - When England Arose. Salme A. Dutt. Review by R.P. Arnot. Labour Monthly. July 1939. 
Colonies and Fascism. [untitled]. Labour Monthly. August 1939. 
Colonies and War: Today's Big Issue. Reginald Bridgeman. Labour Monthly. January 1938. 
Crusade for Defence of the British People. R.P. Arnot. Labour Monthly. January 39. 
Democracy: A Handbook of Freedom, by Jack Lindsay and Edgell Rickword. Review by Allen Hutt. 
Labour Monthly. August 1939. 
Freedom. Clemens Dutt. Labour Monthly. August 1942. 
How Not to Write Communist History? Review of ‘The British Communist Party’. Thomas Bell. 
Review by Allen Hutt. Labour Monthly, June 1937. 
India. D.N. Pritt. Labour Monthly, April 1942. 
Indian Crisis. Ben Bradley. Labour Monthly, May 1943. 
India and World Peace. V.K. Krishna Menon. Labour Monthly. June 1938. 
INDIA — What We Must Do. Ben Bradley. Labour Monthly. September 1942. 
II. India- What Must Be Done. Rajani Palme Dutt. Labour Monthly. September 1942. 
Liberalism and Communism: Forward from Liberalism. Stephen Spender. Book Review by Harry 
Pollitt. Labour Monthly. March 1937. 
Notes of a Patriot. G. Allen Hutt. Labour Monthly, February 1942. 
Notes of the Month. Dutt, R.P. Labour Monthly. Volume 19: January to December 1937: London. 
Notes. R.P. Dutt. Vol 19. Labour Monthly. Jan-December 1937. 
Notes of the Month. The Choice Before Us. R.P. Dutt. Labour Monthly. April 1942. 
Notes of the Month. World Battle. R.P. Dutt. Labour Monthly. January 1942. 
On the Eve of the Indian National Congress. Ben Bradley, R. Palme Dutt and Harry Pollitt. Labour 
Monthly. March 1938. 
Peace and the Colonial Question – Text of a Statement submitted by the CP to the National Peace 
Congress in Bristol on May 28-29, 1938. Labour Monthly, June 1938. 
100 
 
The Communist Crusade, Harry Pollitt. Labour Monthly. February 1939. 
The Communist Party and the Fight for Unity. Harry Pollitt. Labour Monthly, January 1942. 
The English Tradition. R. P. Arnot. Labour Monthly. November 1936.  
The Indian Election. Ben Bradley. Labour Monthly. March 1937. 
The Monarchy Fetish. T.A. Jackson. Labour Monthly. May 1937. 
The Labour Movement and the Countryside. Maurice Cornforth. Labour Monthly, December 1937. 
The Labour Movement and the War. R. Palme Dutt. Labour Monthly, June 1942 
The Peasant’s Revolt: Nine Days That Shook England. Hymie Fagan. Book Review, E.M. Labour 
Monthly. December 1938. 
Tom Mann. Allen Hutt. Labour Monthly. April 1936. 
Unity and the People's Front. Harry Pollitt. Labour Monthly. July 1938. 
Victory and the German People. W. Gallacher. Labour Monthly, May 1942. 
What We Must Do, Ben Bradley. Labour Monthly. April 1942. 
National Archives: 
National Archives. CAB 66/35/9. 
Hansard Millbank: 
Royal Mercantile Marine. 09 May 1929 – Vol. 227. 
Colonial and Middle Eastern Services. 22 February 1937 - Vol. 320. 
Communist Poster. 04 March 1937 - Vol. 321. 
Foreign Affairs. 21 October 1937 - Vol. 327. 
Unemployment and Immigration. 17 November 1937 - Vol. 329. 
Anti-British Propaganda. 02 February 1938 - Vol. 331. 
Government of India Act. 09 February 1938 – Vol.331. 
Army Estimates. 10 March 1938 - Vol. 332. 
Spain. 28 February 1939 - Vol. 344 
Army Estimates. 08 March 1939 - Vol. 344. 
Daily Worker (War Correspondent). 03 August 1944 – Vol. 402.  
Manchester Guardian Archives: 
Mr. Pollitt. March 29th, 1940. 
Manchester’s Centenary: A Marxist Pageant Youth’s Tribute to Tom Mann. June 20th, 1938. 
Fight for Liberty - Communist Pageant in Manchester. July 12th, 1937. 
Mr. Pollitt on the New Communism. August 9th, 1935. 
101 
 
"The Beginning of the End”: Mr. Pollitt on Russia. December 1941. 
Communism’s New Recruits. December 19th, 1936. 
Indian Opinions: A Warning to Congress – August 1st, 1942. 
Marxists.Org: 
Communist Theory Series, No. 1. Four Lesson Course: For the Use of Communist Party Branches and 
Training Groups. CPGB. 1937. 
Dutt, R.P. (1936). Left Nationalism in India. Labour Monthly. 12:10. Book Review: Jawaharlal Nehru: 
An Autobiography: John Lane.  
For Soviet Britain: The Programme of the Communist Party adopted at the XIII Congress. February 
2nd, 1935. 
Hannington, W. (1925). British Terror in India and Egypt. Workers Weekly. January 16th 1925. 
Lenin, V. (1920). Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder. 
Pollitt, H. (1937). In Memory of the British Comrades Who Have Fallen in Spain. The Communist 
International. February 1937, Vol. XIV, No. 2. 
Pollitt, H. (1935). The Influence of Socialist Construction in the U.S.S.R. on Workers in Capitalist 
Countries. The Communist International, Vol. XII, No. 15, August 5, 1935. 
Pollitt, H. (1938). ‘Trial of the Group of Conspirators of the ‘Bloc of Rights and Trotskyists’: The 
Crushing of the Traitors – A Triumph for Peace and Socialism. International Press 
Correspondence.18:14, 19 March 1938. 
Pollitt, H. (1938). The Coming General Election. International Press Correspondence, Volume 18: 3. 
22 January 1938.  
Published Documents: 
Degras, J. (2005). The Communist International 1919-1943: Documents. Volume III, 1929-1943. Frank 
Cass & Co: London. Accessed at: 
https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/documents/volume3-1929-1943.pdf  
Dutt, R.P. (1935). Fascism and Social Revolution. 
Dutt, R.P. (1940). India Today. Random House: London. 
E.C.C.I. Report of the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International. July-August 1935. 
Modern Books Limited: London. 
EWI (Educational Workers’ International) – British Section. Schools at the Cross Roads. London, 
Martin Lawrence, 1935. 
Engels, F. & Marx, K. Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League, London, March 
1850. Accessed at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/communist-league/1850-
ad1.htm  
Engels, F. & Marx, K. (2015). The Communist Manifesto. Penguin Books: London. 
102 
 
Fagan, H. (1938). Nine Days that Shook England: An Account of the English People’s Uprising in 1381. 
London. 
Lenin, V. (2010). Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. Penguin: London. 
Lenin, V.I. (1969). British Labour and British Imperialism: A Compilation of Writings by Lenin on 
Britain. Lawrence and Wishart: London. 
Orwell, G. (1940). Inside the Whale and Other Essays. Victor Gollancz: London. 
Orwell, S. & Angus, I. (1968). The Collected Essays: Journalism and Letters of George Orwell: Volume 
I. London: Secker and Warburg. 
Rust, W. (1939). Britons in Spain. Left Book Club Edition. Lawrence and Wishart: London 
Snowden, P. (1903). The Christ That Is to Be. Independent Labour Party: London. 
The Times Archives: 
Britain's Trust "Betrayed" - April 25th, 1939. 
“Gulf Between the Indian Parties” - Aug 24th, 1942. 
UK Press Online: 
Daily Worker, 1936 –1939. 
Warwick Online Archives: 
15X/1/34/1 – “Challenge”. 3:11. Young Communist League (Great Britain). 
MSS.15X/1/132/25. ‘Trotskyists in Spain – Open Agents of International Fascism’. Communist 
International. 
MSS.15/3/8/229. Communist Party of Great Britain, Central Committee: leaflet calling for a rally on 6 
September, with an appeal by Dolores Ibarruri, known as 'Pasionaria', in support of the democratic 
Spanish government, Undated [1936-1939].  
15X/2/103/303. Communist Party of France: Manifesto - with an introduction by Harry Pollitt. 
January 1944. London. CPGB. 
15X/2/103/204. For Peace and Plenty: Report of the Fifteenth Congress. September 16th to 19th, 
1938. 
MSS.15X/2/103/182. “How is the Empire: The Plain Man’s Guide to the Coronation?” 
15X/2/103/210. Pollitt, H. (1939). “Defence of the People”. 7 February 1939. 
Bevan, E. “Help to Spain and Unity against Fascism”: Speakers Notes. 1936. 
MSS.292/946/20/1. Citrine, W. ‘International Conference on Spain Report’. March 1937. 
MSS.15X/2/103/202. Rust, W. On the Spanish Civil War, the Spanish Republican Army and the 
International Brigade. 
MSS.15X/2/103/181. “One Happy Family”, 14th April 1937. 
MSS.15X/2/103/180. “Parade of War'”. 10 Apr 1937. 
103 
 
MSS.15X/2/103/184. Report of the Central Committee to the 14th National Congress of the CPGB. 4 
June 1937. 
MSS.15X/2/103/202. Rust, W. “Spain Fights for Victory”. 4 Aug 1938 
15X/2/103/170. “Towards a Popular Front”, Horner, A. (1936). London. CPGB. 
292/946/18b/2/. “We Can't Burn Our Finger”. Harry Pollitt. 17 March 1938. 
WCML: 
TAPE/174B, 1942. 
Secondary Sources: 
Anderson, B. (1999). Imagined Communities. Verso Books: London.  
Andrews, G. Fishman, N. & Morgan, K. (1995). Opening the Books: Essays on the Social and Cultural 
History of the British Communist Party. Pluto Press: London. 
Aughey, A. (2007). The Politics of Englishness. Manchester University Press: Manchester. 
Ball, R. (2014). Tolpuddle, Hutt and the Meerut Conspiracy. British Radical History Group. Uploaded 
on 2/07/2014. https://www.brh.org.uk/site/articles/tolpuddle-hutt-meerut-conspiracy/  
Beckett, F. (1995). Enemy Within: The Rise and Fall of the British Communist Party. John Murray Ltd: 
London. 
Bhabha, H. Nation and Narration cited in Pernon, E. (1997). ‘Englishness’: The Narration of Nation. 
Journal of British Studies. 36. 
Billig, M. (1997). Banal Nationalism. Sage Publications: London. 
Branson, N. (1985). History of the Communist Party of Great Britain: 1927-1941. Lawrence and 
Wishart: London. 
Branson, N. Myths from Right and Left cited in Fyrth, J. (1985). Britain, Fascism and the Popular 
Front. Lawrence and Wishart: London 
Buchanan, T. (1997). Britain and The Spanish Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Buchanan, T. (2007). The Impact of the Spanish Civil War on Britain: War, Loss and Memory. 
Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press. 
Buchanan, T. (2016). ‘The Dark Millions in the Colonies Are Unavenged’: Anti-Fascism and Anti-
Imperialism in the 1930s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bush, B. (1999). Imperialism, Race and Resistance: Africa and Britain, 1919-1945. Routledge: London. 
Callaghan, J. (1993). Rajani Palme Dutt: A Study in British Stalinism. Lawrence and Wishart: London. 
Callaghan, J. (1995). The Communists and the Colonies: Anti-Imperialism between the Wars. Cited in 
Andrews, G. Fishman, N. & Morgan, K. (1995). Opening the Books: Essays on the Social and Cultural 
History of the British Communist Party. Pluto Press: London. 
Callaghan, J. (1997). Colonies, Racism, the CPGB and the Comintern in the Inter-War Years. Science 
and Society. New York. 61:4. 
104 
 
Callaghan, J. (2001). Laybourn, K. & Murphy, D. (1999). Under the Red Flag. Sutton Publishing: 
Stroud. International Review of Social History. 46. 
Callaghan, J. & Harker, B. (2016). British Communism: A Documentary History. Manchester University 
Press: Manchester. 
Callaghan, J. (2016). The Global Revolution: A History of International Communism, 1917–1991. 
Pons, S. (2014). The English Historical Review. 131: 549. 
Campbell, J. & McIlroy, A. (2005). A Peripheral Vision: Communist Historiography in Britain. American 
Communist History. 4:2. 
Cannon, J. & Crowcroft, R. (2015). Robert Blatchford - A Dictionary of British History. Oxford 
University Press. 
Carr, E.H. (1982). The Twilight of the Comintern, 1930-1935. Macmillan: London. 
Cozens, J. The Making of the Peterloo Martyrs, 1819 to the Present cited in Outram, Q. & Laybourn, 
K. (2018). Secular Martyrdom in Britain and Ireland: From Peterloo to the Present. Macmillan: 
London. 
Croft, A. Authors Take Sides: Writers and the Communist Party 1920-1956. Cited in Andrews, G. 
Fishman, N. & Morgan, K. (1995). Opening the Books: Essays on the Social and Cultural History of the 
British Communist Party. Pluto Press: London. 
Cunningham, V. & Gustav, K. (2012). Ecology and the Literature of the British Left: The Red and the 
Green. Routledge: Oxon 
Douglas, J. (2010). The Communist Party of Great Britain and the National Question in Wales, 1920-
1991. PhD Thesis. Aberystwyth University.  
Eaden, J. & Renton, D. (2002). The Communist Party of Great Britain since 1920. Palgrave: New York. 
Edmonds, D. (2017). Unpacking 'Chauvinism': The Interrelationship of Race, Internationalism, and 
Anti-Imperialism amongst Marxists in Britain, 1899-1933. PhD Thesis: Manchester University. 
Field, G. (1992). Social Patriotism and the British Working Class: Appearance and Disappearance of a 
Tradition. International Labor and Working-Class History. 42. 
Field, G. (2011). Blood, Sweat, and Toil: Remaking the British Working Class, 1939-1945. Oxford 
University Press: Oxford. 
Flewers, P. (1995). From the Red Flag to the Union Jack: The Rise of Domestic Patriotism in the 
Communist Party of Great Britain. New Interventions. Vol.6 No.2. 
Flewers, P. (2008). The New Civilisation? Understanding Stalin's Soviet Union 1929–1941. Francis 
Boutle Publishers: London. 
Fyrth, J. (1985). Britain, Fascism and the Popular Front. Lawrence and Wishart: London. 
Gellner, E. (1964). Thoughts and Change. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
Gramsci, A. (1971). Civil Society. ‘Internationalism and National Policy’. Lawrence Wishart: London. 
Griffins, C. (1997). Remembering Tolpuddle: Rural History and Commemoration in the Inter-War 
Labour Movement. History Workshop Journal. 44. 
105 
 
Griffins, C. From ‘Dorchester Labourers’ to ‘Tolpuddle Martyrs’: Celebrating Radicalism in the English 
Countryside cited in Outram, Q. & Laybourn, K. (2018). Secular Martyrdom in Britain and Ireland: 
From Peterloo to the Present. Palgrave Macmillan: London. 
Gupta, S.D. (1980). Comintern, India and the Colonial Question, 1920-1937. CSSSC Monograph 3. 
Centre for Studies in Social Science: Calcutta. 
Harker, B. (2011). 'Communism is English': Edgell Rickword, Jack Lindsay and the Cultural Politics of 
the Popular Front. Literature and History.20:2. 
Heinemann, M. The People’s Front and the Intellectuals cited in Fyrth, J. (1985). Britain, Fascism and 
the Popular Front. Lawrence and Wishart: London. 
Hinton, J. The Communist Party, Production and the Post-War Settlement. cited in Andrews, G. 
Fishman, N. & Morgan, K. (1995). Opening the Books: Essays on the Social and Cultural History of the 
British Communist Party. Pluto Press: London. 
Hobsbawm, E.J. Fifty Years of Popular Front’s cited in Fyrth, J. (1985). Britain, Fascism and the 
Popular Front. Lawrence and Wishart: London. 
Hobsbawm, E.J. (1986). The Moscow Line and International Communist Policy 1933-1947. In Wrigley, 
C (ed.). Warfare, Diplomacy and Politics: Essays in Honour of A.J.P. Taylor. Hamish Hamilton: London. 
Hobsbawm, E.J. (1992). Invention of Tradition. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Hobsbawm, E. (1994). Nations and Nationalism Since 1870: Programme, Myth and Reality. 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Jupp, J. (1982). The Radical Left in Britain: 1931-1941. Frank Cass: London. 
Kavanagh, K. (2014). Against Fascism, War and Economies’: the CPGB Schoolteachers During the 
Popular Front, 1935-1939. History of Education, 43:2. 
Khan, Y. (2015). The Raj at War: A People’s History of India’s Second World War. Penguin: London. 
Kirk, N. (2011). Labour and the Politics of Empire. Manchester University Press: Manchester. 
Klugmann, J. (1968). History of the Communist Party of Great Britain: Formation and Early Years. 
Lawrence and Wishart: London. 
Kymlicka, W. (2000). Modernity and National Identity in Ben-Ami, S. (2000). Ethnic Challenges to the 
Modern State. Macmillan Press Ltd: London. 
Laybourn, K. & Murphy, D. (1999). Under the Red Flag: A History of Communism in Britain. Sutton 
Publishing Limited: Sutton. 
Laybourn, K. (2005). A Comment on the Historiography of Communism in Britain. American 
Communist History. 4:2. 
Leech, K. (2004). Noel, Conrad ‘Le Despenser Roden’. (1869–1942). Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography. Accessed at:  https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/37813  
Linehan, T. (2007). Communism in Britain: 1920-1939. Manchester University Press: Manchester. 
106 
 
Macintrye, S. (1975). Imperialism and the British Labour Movement in the 1920s: An Examination of 
Marxist Theory. Our History: London. Accessed at: 
http://banmarchive.org.uk/collections/shs/pdf/64%20imp.pdf  
Macintyre, S. (1980). Little Moscows: Communism and Working-Class Militancy in Inter-War Britain. 
Croon Helm: London. 
Mackenzie, A.J. (1978). British Marxists and Empire: Anti-Imperialist Theory and Practice, 1920-1945. 
PhD Thesis. Birkbeck University. 
Mates, L. (2007). The Spanish Civil War and the British Left: Political Activism and the Popular Front. 
Tauris Academic Studies: London. 
Engels, F. & Marx, K. (2015). The Communist Manifesto. Penguin Books: London. 
McIlroy, J. (2013). Restoring Stalinism to Communist History. Critique. 41:4. 
Miliband, R. (1983). Class Power and State Power. Verso: London. 
Morgan, K. (1989). Against Fascism and War: Ruptures and Continuities in British Communist Party 
Politics 1935-41. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Morgan, K. (1993). The CPGB and the Comintern Archives. Socialist History. Autumn 1993. 
Morgan, K. (1993). Pollitt. Manchester University Press: Manchester. 
Morgan, K. et al. (2007). Communists and British Society: People of a Special Mould, 1920-1991. 
Rivers Oram Press: London. 
Mottram, D. (2017). Shaping the Inheritance of the Spanish Civil War on the British Left, 1939-1945. 
PhD Thesis. Manchester University. 
Newton, K. (1969). The Sociology of British Communism. Penguin Press: London. 
Owen, N. (2007). The British Left and India: Metropolitan Anti-Imperialism, 1885-1947. Oxford 
University Press: Oxford. 
Pearce, B & Woodhouse, M. (1995). A History of Communism in Britain. Bookmarks: London. 
Pelling, H. (1958). The British Communist Party: An Historical Profile. A & C. Black: London. 
Pimlott, B. (1977). Labour and the Left in the 1930s. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 
Porter, G. The World’s Ill-Divided: The Communist Party and Progressive Song cited in Croft, A. 
(1998). A Weapon in the Struggle: The Cultural History of the Communist Party in Britain. Pluto Press. 
Prashad, V. (2007). The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World. The New Press: New 
York. 
Redfern, N. (2004). British Communists, the British Empire and the Second World War. International 
Labor and Working-Class History.65. 
Redfern, N. (2005). Class or Nation: Communists, Imperialism and Two World Wars. International 
Library of Political Studies: London. 
Redfern, N. (2017). The Comintern and Imperialism: A Balance Sheet. Journal of Labour and Society. 
20. 
107 
 
Rose, S.O. (2006). Which People's War? National Identity and Citizenship in Wartime Britain, 1939-
1945. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Said, E. (2003). Orientalism. Penguin Books: London. 
Samuel, R. (2017). The Lost World of British Communism. Verso: London. 
Schwartz, B. Conservatism, Nationalism and Imperialism. In Hall, D. & S. Hall. (1986). Politics and 
Ideology. Open University: Milton Keynes. 
Sherwood, M. (1996). The CPGB, the Colonial Question and Black Britons, 1920-1938. Science & 
Society. 60:2.  
Singer, W. Peasants and the Peoples of the East: Indians and the rhetoric of the Comintern. Rees, T. 
& Thorpe, A. (1998). International Communism and the Communist International, 1919-43. 
Manchester University Press: Manchester. 
Smith, E. (2016). National Liberation for Whom? The Postcolonial Question, the Communist Party of 
Great Britain. International Review of Social History. 61:2.  
Smith, S.A. (2014). The Oxford Handbook of the History of Communism. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Smith, S. A. Issues in Comintern Historiography. In Smith, S.A. (2014). The Oxford Handbook of the 
History of Communism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Taylor, M. (1990). Patriotism, History and the Left in Twentieth-Century Britain. The Historical 
Journal. 33:4. 
Thorpe, A. (1989). The Failure of Political Extremism in Inter-War Britain. Exeter University Press: 
Exeter. 
Thorpe, A. (1998). Comintern ‘Control’ of the Communist Party of Great Britain: 1920-1943. The 
English Historical Review. 113:452. 
Thorpe, A. The Communist International and the British Communist Party. Rees, T. & Thorpe, A. 
(1998). International Communism and the Communist International, 1919-43. Manchester University 
Press: Manchester. 
Thorpe, A. (2000). The British Communist Party and Moscow 1920-1943. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 
Virdee, S. (2014). Racism, Class and the Racialized Outsider. Palgrave Macmillan: London. 
Virdee, S. (2015). Opening a Dialogue on Race, Class and National Belonging. Ethnic and Racial 
Studies. 38:13. 
Wallis, M. Heirs to the Pageant: Mass Spectacle and the Popular Front. In Croft, A. (1998). Weapons 
in the Struggle: The Cultural History of the British Communist Party. Pluto Press. 
Ward, P. (1998). Red Flag and Union Jack: Englishness, Patriotism and the British Left, 1881-1924. 
The Royal Historical Society. Boydell Press: Suffolk. 
Ward, P. (1999). Socialists "True" Patriotism in Britain in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries. 
National Identities. 1. 
108 
 
Ward, P. (2002) Preparing for the People's War: The Left and Patriotism in the 1930's. Labour History 
Review. 67:2. 
Ward, P. (2004). Britishness since 1870. Routledge: London. 
Windmiller, M. & Overstreet, G. (1959). Communism in India. University of California Press: Los 
Angeles. 
Wintringham, T. (2011). English Captain. Fader: London. 
Wood, C. The Communist Party of India: From Leftism to United Front cited in Fyrth, J. (1985). 
Britain, Fascism and the Popular Front. Lawrence and Wishart: London. 
Worley, M. (2001). Class Against Class: The CPGB Between the Wars. I.B. Tauris: London. 
Young, J.D. (1989). Socialism and the English Working Class: A History of English Labour, 1883-1939. 
Harvester Wheatsheaf: London. 
Interviews: 
“Writing about Communism,” Vijay Prashad. (5 Feb 2016), delivered April 17th, 2015. Institute for 
Comparative Modernities, Cornell University. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AVoFFnyEY_w&t=2087s&pbjreload=10  
Novara Media. (2018). Vijay Prashad: Neoliberalism, Global Capital and the Indian Left. Uploaded 
24th September 2018. http://novaramedia.com/2018/09/24/vijay-prashad-neoliberalism-global-
capital-the-indian-left/ 
Evan Smith: British Communism and the Politics of Race - interviewed by Selim Nadi. Historical 
Materialism. http://www.historicalmaterialism.org/node/919  
 
  
